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Solon Barocas* & Karen Levy** 
Abstract: This Article offers a comprehensive survey of privacy dependencies—the 
many ways that our privacy depends on the decisions and disclosures of other people. What 
we do and what we say can reveal as much about others as it does about ourselves, even 
when we don’t realize it or when we think we’re sharing information about ourselves alone. 
We identify three bases upon which our privacy can depend: our social ties, our similarities 
to others, and our differences from others. In a tie-based dependency, an observer learns 
about one person by virtue of her social relationships with others—family, friends, or other 
associates. In a similarity-based dependency, inferences about our unrevealed attributes are 
drawn from our similarities to others for whom that attribute is known. And in difference-
based dependencies, revelations about ourselves demonstrate how we are different from 
others—by showing, for example, how we “break the mold” of normal behavior or 
establishing how we rank relative to others with respect to some desirable attribute. We 
elaborate how these dependencies operate, isolating the relevant mechanisms and providing 
concrete examples of each mechanism in practice, the values they implicate, and the legal 
and technical interventions that may be brought to bear on them. Our work adds to a growing 
chorus demonstrating that privacy is neither an individual choice nor an individual value—
but it is the first to systematically demonstrate how different types of dependencies can raise 
very different normative concerns, implicate different areas of law, and create different 
challenges for regulation.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When two people—let’s call them Alice and Bob1—interact, and Alice 
learns something about Bob in the process, Bob may place his faith in 
Alice that she will not communicate these details to others. Bob’s privacy 
depends, in part, on Alice’s behavior: here, her willingness to abstain from 
speaking about their interactions. While Bob may rely on various social 
mechanisms—personal requests, social sanctions, harms to Alice’s 
reputation, etc.—to ensure that Alice does not divulge his information to 
others, Bob cannot exercise complete control over Alice’s behaviors. And 
perhaps he should not be able to; allowing Bob such a right suggests that 
Alice has no—or perhaps a lesser—claim to those details that emerged in 
their interaction. When preferences conflict, it can be practically difficult 
to disentangle whether the information “belongs” to Alice or to Bob and 
which of them ought to have control over disclosure decisions.2 
Such conflicts are common on social media, where, for example, Alice 
may post an unflattering photo of Bob that Bob would rather not have 
others see.3 When Alice and Bob disagree on whether the photo should 
remain online, whose interests should prevail? While social networks like 
Facebook have carved out important exceptions for when Bob might 
assert a superior privacy claim over the photo,4 the platform does not grant 
Bob exclusive rights over any image in which he might appear—instead, 
it encourages users like Bob “to get in touch with the person who posted 
 
1. Alice and Bob are “the world’s most famous cryptographic couple.” Since 1978, the fictional 
duo has been used as standard placeholders in explanations of cryptographic protocols and other 
engineering problems (e.g., “Alice sends a message to Bob,” “Alice and Bob wish to exchange a 
private key”). See Quinn DuPont & Alana Cattapan, Alice and Bob: A History of the World’s Most 
Famous Couple, CRYPTOCOUPLE (2017), http://cryptocouple.com/Alice%20and%20Bob%20-
%20DuPont%20and%20Cattapan%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/PTZ9-22A4].  
2. See generally SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY: DIALECTICS OF DISCLOSURE (2002) 
(describing those entrusted with others’ private information as “co-owners” of that information). 
3. See Gergely Biczók & Pern Hui Chia, Interdependent Privacy: Let Me Share Your Data, in 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FINANCE CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 338 (2013) 
(describing nonconsensual photo tagging as an example of privacy’s interdependent nature). 
4. These include, among other things, non-consensual pornography. See Community Standards: 
Sexual Exploitation of Adults, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/safety/s
exual_exploitation_adults [https://perma.cc/7NRR-L7N7]. 
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this content in order to resolve the issue.”5 Apple similarly relies on its 
users to negotiate disparate privacy preferences about whether to submit 
voicemail recordings to improve its speech recognition algorithms. If Bob 
leaves a voicemail on Alice’s phone, Alice is charged with the decision 
about whether to give Apple access to it—but is warned: “Do not submit 
recordings if you believe the speaker would be uncomfortable with you 
submitting the content to Apple.”6 Google likewise invokes interpersonal 
etiquette, imploring the owners of Nest smart devices to disclose the 
devices’ presence to guests in their homes.7 By encouraging users to work 
out privacy conflicts among themselves, rather than mediating the conflict 
through rule or technology, Facebook, Apple, and Google evince the 
common hesitation that platforms and policymakers have about involving 
themselves too directly in what are seen as interpersonal 
information conflicts.8 
One might view these situations as a conflict between Bob’s privacy 
and Alice’s freedom of speech.9 For our purposes, they highlight a more 
fundamental point: to the extent that people do not retreat completely from 
 
5. See Photos or Videos that Violate Your Privacy, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/imageprivacyrights [https://perma.cc/4F3G-U4A2]. Strahilevitz 
describes these situations as “collective privacy” conflicts. LIOR STRAHILEVITZ, THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 217 (Saul Levmore & Martha Nussbaum eds., 
2010); James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1171–72 (2009) (describing 
photo tagging and un-tagging on Facebook due to individuals’ divergent privacy preferences). 
Facebook also throws up its hands with respect to personal information shared through friends’ 
contact lists, stating that: “People own their address books . . . . We understand that in some cases this 
may mean that another person may not be able to control the contact information someone else 
uploads about them.” Kashmir Hill, Facebook is Giving Advertisers Access to Your Shadow Contact 
Information, GIZMODO (Sep. 26, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/facebook-is-giving-advertisers-access-
to-your-shadow-co-1828476051 [https://perma.cc/UJB8-2FWA] (quoting a Facebook 
spokesperson).  
6. See Anthony Bouchard, How to Use Voicemail Transcription on iPhone, IDOWNLOAD BLOG 
(Sep. 21, 2016), https://www.idownloadblog.com/2016/09/21/iphone-voicemail-transcription/ 
[https://perma.cc/F4CL-3EC3] (emphasis added); Peter Skomoroch (@peteskomoroch), TWITTER 
(Oct. 10, 2018, 10:30 PM), https://twitter.com/peteskomoroch/status/1050197774430396416 
[https://perma.cc/F99M-KYYA] (displaying screenshot of Apple’s instructions). 
7. Leo Kelion, Google Chief: I’d Disclose Smart Speakers Before Guests Enter My Home, BBC 
NEWS (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-50048144 [https://perma.cc/6MXV-
C38F]. Google’s devices chief continued, however, to suggest that data collection is “probably 
something that the products themselves should try to indicate.” Id. 
8. See Karen Levy, Relational Big Data, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 78 (2013) (“[I]n most cases, 
interpersonal privacy intrusions . . . fall outside the realm of legal redress, precisely because the law 
is traditionally hesitant to get involved in the minutiae of personal relationships.”); Karen Levy, 
Intimate Surveillance, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 679, 692 (2015) (describing law’s hesitation to “rais[e] the 
curtain upon domestic privacy” by exposing that which “ought to be left to family government” 
(quoting State v. A.B. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453, 454, 459 (1868))). 
9. Asserting that a person should be able to control what another says about their interactions is 
what Eugene Volokh has called a “right to stop people from speaking about you.” Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People 
from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (2000). 
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society, everyone’s privacy depends on what others do. There is no way 
to live in the world without putting yourself at risk that others might make 
use of information about you in ways to which you do not consent. This 
is as true of someone interacting with close family, friends, and colleagues 
as it is of someone walking down a busy city street among strangers. No 
one can claim exclusive privilege to the information communicated in 
these encounters. In this most basic sense, individuals’ privacy always 
depends on others’ discretion. 
The ever-present possibility that Alice might betray Bob’s confidence 
does not mean that Bob lives in a constant state of anxiety. When the 
social tie is a close one, social, reputational, and emotional considerations 
can operate to limit Alice’s disclosures about Bob.10 Information sharing 
often closely accompanies social connection: pals are commonly 
confidants,11 and the fact that Alice and Bob have control over one 
another’s private information can facilitate mutual cooperation, trust, and 
confidence in their relationship. Bob’s dependency on Alice effectively 
communicates to Alice that he trusts her with such details, fostering 
intimacy rather than suspicion. Alice may recognize that withholding 
information shared in confidence is necessary to maintain Bob’s 
confidence in her. And when trading personal information back and forth, 
Alice and Bob may knowingly and happily put themselves in a position 
of mutual dependency.12 
The regulation of Bob’s privacy vis-à-vis Alice’s behavior, under these 
conditions, is really a matter of appropriate social conduct, where 
violations are met with accusations of betrayal or a questioning of 
character.13 Social norms can curb information sharing that implicates 
 
10. Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, Networked Privacy: How Teenagers Negotiate Context in 
Social Media, 16 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1051, 1061 (2014) (“In a networked setting, teens cannot 
depend on single-handedly controlling how their information is distributed. What their peers share 
about them, and what they do with the information they receive cannot be regulated technically, but 
must be negotiated socially.”); Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 
65 DUKE L.J. 385, 452 (2015) (“Shaming is a social sanction, which is frequently used as a reaction 
to informational damage. Spread rumors about a sister-in-law, and expect to be ostracized at family 
gatherings. Air dirty laundry on Facebook, and expect to be defriended.”). 
11. CYNTHIA FEE, THANK YOU FOR BEING A FRIEND (Asylum Records 1985) (theme song for The 
Golden Girls). 
12. ARI E. WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 51 (2018). 
13. As Nissenbaum has argued, privacy should thus not be understood as a matter of control, but 
rather in terms of information flows that abide by context-dependent norms. HELEN NISSENBAUM, 
PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2009); see also 
Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1996) 
(discussing the relationship between law and norms in the context of blackmail); Lior J. Strahilevitz, 
Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359 (2003); Yu Pu 
& Jens Grossklags, Sharing is Caring, Or Callous?, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FINANCE 
CRYPTOLOGY AND NETWORK SECURITY 670 (2016) (investigating relationships between the value 
people attach to data about their friends and their perceived level of bonding social capital). 
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other people’s privacy, even in the absence of law—and can do so in ways 
that are recognized as necessary for a well-functioning society. 
But privacy norms, however important, are limited prophylactics to 
these problems. The situation described above is a simple one: Bob 
depends on Alice not to tell others his secret. But our privacy is 
determined by others’ choices in many far more complicated situations 
than this. This may be because Alice’s disclosure implicating Bob is 
involuntary, or because she doesn’t know the effect it will have on Bob; 
or because she has no relationship to or knowledge of Bob at all. In fact, 
Alice may disclose information that is explicitly and exclusively about 
Alice, seemingly having nothing whatsoever to do with Bob, and can still 
implicate his privacy in so doing. In these situations, social norms are of 
limited utility in protecting Bob’s privacy. 
This Article explores the varied ways in which one person’s privacy is 
implicated by information others reveal. We term these phenomena 
privacy dependencies and we identify three broad types. In a tie-based 
dependency, an observer learns about one person by virtue of that person’s 
social relationships with others—family, friends, or other associates. This 
may occur, for example, when a person subject to surveillance 
communicates with others: even those who are not the person of interest 
might be “caught in the net” of observation. In a similarity-based 
dependency, inferences about our unrevealed attributes are drawn from 
our similarities to others for whom that attribute is known. And in 
difference-based dependencies, revelations about ourselves demonstrate 
how we are different from others—by showing how we “break the mold” 
of normal behavior, showing how we rank relatively on some desirable 
attribute, or by allowing an observer to pinpoint an unknown person 
through process of elimination. 
Prior research has explored privacy’s socially interdependent nature in 
various ways.14 Research on the social value of privacy underscores the 
necessity of privacy to social functioning: individual privacy guarantees 
enable collective values to flourish by making space for individuals to live 
freely, interact unreservedly, and participate fully in social life. In this 
way, social groups enjoy the benefits afforded by individual privacy.15 
 
14. For a survey of work about how different technical research communities have examined 
interdependent privacy and a review of methodologies that have been used to study the problem, see 
Mathias Humbert et al., A Survey on Interdependent Privacy, 52 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 122 
(2019), https://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/264048 [https://perma.cc/BC8Y-JAAX]. 
15. See generally PRISCILLA REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (1995); BEATE ROESSLER & DOROTA MOKROSINSKA, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF 
PRIVACY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (2015); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 
89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. 
REV. 1609 (1999); Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of 
Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 760–64 (2007). 
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Complementary work on group privacy recognizes privacy interests that 
inhere in group membership—both the “right to huddle” in private 
association with others16 and a privacy interest in aggregated statistical 
attributes of groups to which one belongs.17 Work on relational privacy 
recognizes that different privacy expectations attach to different people 
and institutions in our lives and suggests that law should take into account 
these different sensitivities in setting rules about such expectations (for 
example, by recognizing that we may have a greater interest in privacy 
against the government than we do against our neighbors).18 Networked 
privacy explores the complex and creative practices required to negotiate 
information flows in networked spaces (e.g., social media platforms), 
thanks in part to others’ roles in sharing information about us.19 Other 
work has drawn from economic concepts—exploring, for example, the 
idea of privacy externalities, which exist “where one person’s decision to 
share information can adversely affect others who choose to remain 
silent,”20 and privacy as a public good, which observes that “[a]n 
 
16. See Edward J. Bloustein, Group Privacy: The Right to Huddle, 8 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 219 
(1977). Bloustein is often credited with coining the term group privacy, which he suggests is “a form 
of privacy that people seek in their associations with others.” Id. at 221. On Bloustein’s account, 
group privacy “is an attribute of individuals in association with one another within a group, rather 
than an attribute of the group itself[,]” akin to the shared secrecy expected between lovers or in a 
football huddle. Id. at 221–23. Bloustein’s concern is about individuals associating themselves with 
others, rather than based on shared characteristics among people. 
17.  LINNET TAYLOR, LUCIANO FLORIDI & BART VAN DER SLOOT, GROUP PRIVACY: NEW 
CHALLENGES OF DATA TECHNOLOGIES (2017); Anton Vedder, KDD: The Challenge to 
Individualism, 1 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 275 (1999). In light of the limitations of the individual privacy 
model to address the harms of data mining, Vedder introduces the idea of categorical privacy, which 
protects “information . . . [which is] originally taken from the personal sphere of individuals, and—
after aggregation and processing according to statistical methods—is no longer accompanied by 
identifiers of individual natural persons, but, instead, by identifiers of groups of persons[.]” Id. at 279. 
Taylor et al. discuss two ontologies of group privacy: one attached to groups of individuals (what they 
term an entity-first approach, in which group privacy is understood as “a result of the collection of 
the privacies of the constituting members”) and one attached to particular attributes (a predicate-first 
approach, in which group privacy is “an emergent property, over and above the collection of the 
privacies of the constituting members”). TAYLOR ET AL., supra, at 7–8. 
18.  Karen Levy et al., Regulating Privacy in Public/Private Space: The Case of Nursing Home 
Monitoring Laws, 26 ELDER L.J. 323, 327–29 (2019); Laurent Sacharoff, The Relational Nature of 
Privacy, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1249 (2012). 
19. Networked privacy conceptualizes privacy as a set of practices to manage and negotiate 
boundaries between audiences and contexts in networked information systems. As previously 
bounded social contexts blur into one another and disrupt context-specific norms, people struggle to 
control what information is shared about them, and by whom. As a result, people develop new 
strategies, both individual and collective, to manage their privacy (e.g., steganographic posting, 
strategic content curation). See Eszter Hargittai & Alice Marwick, “What Can I Really Do?” 
Explaining the Privacy Paradox with Online Apathy, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 3737 (2016); Marwick & 
Boyd, supra note 10, at 1603; Phillip Fei Wu et al., A Contextual Approach to Information Privacy 
Research, 70 J. ASS’N INFO. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2019). 
20. Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and Externalities, 6 I/S: 
J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 425, 428–29 (2011). Our notion of privacy dependencies is somewhat 
broader than MacCarthy’s definition of privacy externalities. MacCarthy explicitly excludes from his 
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individual who is careless with data exposes not only extensive 
information about herself, but about others as well.”21 
And for perhaps the first time, interdependence is becoming part of 
mainstream public discourse about privacy. This development owes in 
large part to recent high-profile situations in which one person’s privacy 
has depended on the choices of another—most notably, the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal in March 2018 (in which Facebook users unwittingly 
revealed information about their friends to a political consulting firm) and 
the increasing use of familial DNA search in criminal investigations (in 
which suspects are apprehended based on DNA their relatives submitted 
to genealogical databases). In the public imagination, these two situations 
lay bare the degree to which our most intimate associates—friends and 
family—can expose us.22 But our privacy depends on others in far more 
situations than these, and in many diverse forms—including contexts in 
which informants are more socially distant than friends or family, and 
even less likely to be governed by relational norms that might 
mediate  disclosure. 
Scholars have pointed to privacy’s social nature as yet another nail in 
the coffin of the individualistic, notice-and-consent model of privacy 
regulation, arguing that in addition to the model’s other problems,23 it fails 
to provide protection for those whose privacy depends on others but who 
 
analysis “phenomena where one person is directly disclosing information about another person[,]” 
focusing instead on cases in which “the data subject reveals information only about himself” that 
nonetheless negatively impacts others. Id. at 449. The types of dependencies we describe include 
instances of both cases. Economists have also studied the issue using game-theoretic approaches, 
demonstrating that information externalities can lead to market disequilibria. See Daron Acemoglu et 
al., Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 26296, 2019) (establishing that others’ disclosures will undermine consumers’ 
ability to command a price for their own data that is in keeping with how much they value their 
privacy); Jay Pil Choi et al., Privacy and Personal Data Collection With Information Externalities, 
173 J. PUB. ECON. 113 (2019) (demonstrating that externalities lead to disequilibrium even with 
informed consent); Mathias Humbert et al., On Non-Cooperative Genomic Privacy, in 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FINANCE CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 407 (2015) 
(showing inefficient equilibria in the context of sharing genetic data when family members have 
different sharing preferences). 
21. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 10, at 385. Our exploration here includes some cases in which an 
individual is “careless” with his own data and hence implicates others’ interests, but also cases in 
which individuals disclose their own data involuntarily. 
22. As an example of such discourse, see Will Oremus, How the Golden State Killer’s DNA Search 
is Like the Cambridge Analytica Scandal, SLATE (May 1, 2018), 
https://slate.com/technology/2018/05/how-the-golden-state-killers-dna-search-is-like-the-
cambridge-analytica-scandal.html [https://perma.cc/M4BB-W9SP] (“Cambridge Analytica and 
GEDmatch are a stark reminder that the problems go deeper than just better informing users of what 
they’re giving up about themselves.” (emphasis added)). 
23. See generally NISSENBAUM, supra note 13; Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-
Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013), for a review of the 
philosophical and practical grounds for discounting the individual model of privacy regulation. 
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receive no opportunity to withhold consent.24 We agree—and claim 
further that the particular mechanisms of the dependency pose 
meaningfully different threats to privacy and its protection. We survey the 
various mechanisms behind these dependencies, placing them into a 
framework that highlights how they relate to and differ from one another. 
In so doing, we illustrate how different normative values—freedom of 
association, social solidarity, nondiscrimination, and others—attach to 
these arrangements, and consider how social practices, policies, and 
technical interventions respond to them. We pay particular attention to 
how different dependencies implicate diverse areas of law. 
Part II presents this framework. We consider three different categories 
of privacy dependency: dependencies based on a tie between individuals 
(section II.A); dependencies based on similarity between them 
(section II.B); and dependencies based on differences between them 
(section II.C). In Part III, we explore the interaction of our dependency 
forms in the context of genetics, as an illustration of how they merge, 
conflict, and implicate different values in practice. Part IV concludes with 
implications for privacy’s protection. 
II. THREE TYPES OF PRIVACY DEPENDENCIES 
First, a comment on notation. We’ll refer throughout to three 
characters: Alice, Bob, and the Observer. In our model, Alice is the party 
who reveals some sort of information to the Observer—and in all cases, 
Alice’s disclosure leads to the Observer learning some information about 
Bob. We can say, in each case, that Bob’s privacy is dependent on Alice’s 
disclosure or nondisclosure of information. We choose not to personalize 
the Observer beyond its instrumental status as the collector of Alice’s 
information. The Observer could, in principle, be an individual—but as 
we shall see, in most practical cases, it stands in for a corporate or 
governmental actor (say, the police or a social media platform). 
Across our cases, there is considerable variety about what it is that 
Alice shares and why she does so. Alice’s disclosure may include 
information that is—on its face—solely about Alice; solely about Bob; or 
about the both of them and their relationship to one another. In varying 
circumstances, Alice may or may not intend, or even know, that she is 
 
24. See, e.g., MacCarthy, supra note 20, at 447 (arguing against the individual informed consent 
model of privacy protection because “[i]ndividual level choices will result in data collection and use 
patterns that impose substantial tangible costs on individuals who are not directly involved in making 
those choices”). MacCarthy argues, instead, for an “unfairness framework” that weighs the public 
benefit of information practices against prospective harms, and incorporates potential privacy 
externalities into the calculus. Id. at 430. Fairfield and Engel similarly note the limitations of the 
individual model, and argue for using tools and concepts from the behavioral economics literature on 
public goods to protect privacy at the group level. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 10, at 388–89; see 
also Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Privacy Harms and the Effectiveness of the Notice and Choice 
Framework, 11 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 485 (2015). 
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disclosing anything at all to the Observer—or she may be coerced, 
incentivized, or required to do so. Alternatively, she may reveal 
information wholly upon her own volition, with or without awareness of 
the privacy consequences of her actions for Bob. 
As a final wrinkle, a privacy dependency may involve one or many 
Alices, and one or many Bobs. The Observer may learn something 
meaningful about Bob only upon the disclosures of several Alices; 
alternatively, a single Alice may reveal something with privacy 
consequences for numerous Bobs. And as we shall see, both additional 
combinations (an Alice and a Bob, many Alices and many Bobs) 
also  occur. 
A. Tie 
Data about us often reside in those with whom we associate. An 
Observer who gathers information about Alice may learn about Bob by 
virtue of his connection to Alice. Indeed, by capitalizing on the 
relationship between Alice and Bob, an Observer can circumvent 
obstacles to learning about Bob directly—and can often make better sense 
of the information obtained about Alice. Observers commonly leverage 
our interpersonal connections to collect information about individuals via 
their associates (a dynamic we call passthrough); incidentally observe one 
person in the course of observing another (bycatch); identify unknown 
people based on their relationships with known others (identification); and 
justify the collection of data about the people with whom individuals are 
connected (tie-justified observation). 
1. Passthrough 
In some cases, Alice may serve as a conduit through which Bob’s 
information is passed to the Observer. As mentioned above, Bob may 
have previously shared some bit of personal information with Alice, 
which Alice subsequently passes along. Alice may share Bob’s 
information knowingly, perhaps upon having been coerced or 
incentivized to do so. The practice of acting as a confidential informant is 
a classic example: because law enforcement cannot observe Bob directly, 
it leverages Alice’s social tie to Bob to gather intelligence about Bob. The 
Observer may provide Alice with some sort of favorable treatment in 
exchange for providing information about Bob—or may exploit existing 
weaknesses in Alice and Bob’s relationship.25 
 
25. See Spencer Headworth, Getting to Know You: Welfare Fraud Investigation and the Appropriation 
of Social Ties, 84 AM. SOC. REV. 171, 181 (2019) (noting that people may be motivated to report associates’ 
welfare fraud as “an instrument for personal agendas or a weapon in interpersonal conflicts”).  
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But Alice may also serve as a passthrough for Bob’s data in much more 
commonplace situations, and even without her knowledge. An Observer 
may, for instance, trick Alice into providing information about one or 
many Bobs to whom she is connected. A prominent example is social 
networks’ practice of encouraging users to upload contact lists in order to 
find friends who already use the service—and to solicit participation by 
those who don’t, while building “shadow” profiles of these non-users.26 If 
enough of Bob’s friends and associates have uploaded their contact lists, 
the social network will know Bob’s precise position in the social graph, 
despite his steadfast refusal to join the network. Prompting users to share 
their contact lists is one of the most common “dark patterns”27 on the web: 
platforms and messaging apps often mislead users into doing so through 
sneaky design tactics or promises of a better user experience on the site.28 
Less intuitively, privacy dependencies can also result when the 
Observer acts as a passthrough; that is, when Bob seeks to share some 
information with Alice but can only do so by first passing it to the 
Observer. These situations, increasingly common as personal 
communications are mediated by platforms, practically require Bob to 
knowingly reveal information about himself to an Observer—because 
doing so is the only practical way he can communicate with Alice. Bob 
may find himself under increasing pressure to reveal information about 
himself as a larger share of his associates begin to communicate through 
intermediaries with centralized architectures (i.e., when all the 
connections between nodes pass through a centralized hub). Common 
 
26. Daniel K. Gillmor, Facebook is Tracking Me Even Though I’m Not on Facebook, ACLU: FREE 
FUTURE BLOG (Apr. 5, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-
privacy/facebook-tracking-me-even-though-im-not-facebook   [https://perma.cc/VER3-HHBV] 
(“Facebook uses . . . contact information to learn about people, even if those people don’t agree to 
participate. It also links people together based on who they know, even if the shared contact hasn’t 
agreed to this use. For example, I received an email from Facebook that lists the people who have all 
invited me to join Facebook: my aunt, an old co-worker, a friend from elementary school, 
etc. . . . Facebook records this group of people as my contacts, even though I’ve never agreed to this 
kind of data collection.”); see also Iraklis Symeonidis et al., Collateral Damage of Facebook Third-
Party Applications: A Comprehensive Study, 77 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 179 (2018) (discussing the 
prevalence of “collateral information collection”—that is, information about a user’s friends—across 
Facebook apps). 
27. Friend Spam, DARK PATTERNS, https://darkpatterns.org/types-of-dark-pattern/friend-spam 
[https://perma.cc/ZGT7-BXHD]. 
28. In 2015, LinkedIn settled a lawsuit for $13 million for harvesting contacts from users through 
such tactics and then spamming those contacts with invitations, seemingly sent by the user, to join 
the service. John Brownlee, After Lawsuit Settlement, LinkedIn’s Dishonest Design is Now a $13 
Million Problem, FASTCO DESIGN (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.fastcodesign.com/3051906/after-
lawsuit-settlement-linkedins-dishonest-design-is-now-a-13-million-problem 
[https://perma.cc/VH5W-U37K]. And WhatsApp came under fire from Canadian and Dutch privacy 
regulators for auto-populating users’ contact lists from their phone address books, and for retaining 
this contact information on their own servers. Chester Wisniewski, WhatsApp’s Privacy Investigated 
by Joint Canadian-Dutch Probe, NAKED SECURITY (Jan. 29, 2013), 
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/01/29/whatsapps-privacy-investigated-by-joint-canadian-
dutch-probe [https://perma.cc/6R6W-NVSX]. 
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communication infrastructures ranging from telephones to online social 
networks enjoy so-called “network effects”: as a greater number of Bob’s 
associates participate, Bob stands to benefit more from participating as 
well.29 Alice and others’ decisions to join (and hence share information 
with) Facebook, for example, may create powerful incentives for Bob to 
join, especially if Bob would miss out on valued social interactions should 
he abstain. Their decisions do not compromise Bob’s privacy directly; 
instead, their choices make Bob’s refusal to share information more 
costly. Bob may find that reaching his associates is less convenient, more 
expensive, or outright impossible if he does not join the platform.30 In 
other words, he might feel compelled to participate by the choices that 
Alice and others have made. 
Network effects can make leaving a platform difficult as well.31 Alice 
and Bob—along with all of their associates—may decide that they no 
longer want to share their information with Facebook as a condition of 
communicating with each other, but they cannot replicate the value that 
Facebook offers unless they all move, collectively, to another platform. 
Network effects often create a type of collective action problem because 
no one wants to be the first person to leave the network. At the same time, 
individual actors may find it difficult to coordinate a wholesale move. Bob 
may hesitate to leave unless he knows that he’ll be able to find Alice 
elsewhere; he’d likely have even less confidence in his ability to persuade 
all of his other associates to make the move with him. Once Alice, Bob, 
and their associates have made the decision to join a network, none of 
them may be in a position to orchestrate their effective individual or 
collective departure. 
Data portability and interoperability between platforms are often cited 
as possible solutions to this problem—but their success in practice has 
 
29. See generally DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS: 
REASONING ABOUT A HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD 509–42 (2010). Network effects can be either 
general (in which only the number of additional adopters provides the benefit) or identity-specific 
(when who adopts matters—for example, high-status users, or one’s particular group of friends). In 
other words, network effects may incentivize Bob’s participation on a data-gathering platform either 
because many Alices choose to adopt (general) or because particular Alices of social import to Bob 
adopt (identity-specific). See Paul DiMaggio & Joseph Cohen, Information Inequality and Network 
Externalities: A Comparative Study of the Diffusion of Television and the Internet, in THE ECONOMIC 
SOCIOLOGY OF CAPITALISM 235–36 (Victor Nee & Richard Swedberg eds., 2004). 
30. Various studies have attempted to specify the social and economic costs of opt-out from social 
networks. See, e.g., GREG NORCIE & L. JEAN CAMP, THE PRICE OF PRIVACY: AN EXAMINATION OF 
THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF ABSTENTION FROM SOCIAL NETWORKS 2–3 (2015), 
http://www.ljean.com/files/abstain.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ5T-QYUV] (explaining how abstention 
from social network sites may impede access to career opportunities). 
31. Eric P.S. Baumer et al., Limiting, Leaving, and (re)Lapsing: An Exploration of Facebook Non-
Use Practices and Experiences, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS 
IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 3257, 3257 (2013). 
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been limited.32 At best, data portability would allow Alice and Bob to find 
a different Observer to mediate their communication. And even when 
standards are interoperable, Alice and Bob will have to reveal information 
to each other’s service providers. Consider what happens if Alice uses 
Gmail: Bob can only reach her by email if he sends his message to 
Google’s email servers (even if Bob is not himself a Gmail user). In other 
words, Alice’s decision to use Gmail requires Bob to disclose information 
to Google as a condition of communicating with her.33 
The law has occasionally taken pains to preserve the sanctity of social 
ties, but in other respects, it has created structures that enable the easy 
exploitation of ties for the procurement of information. As we have noted, 
the law is loath to regulate passthrough-based disclosures in many cases, 
generally preferring that social norms be relied upon to govern 
disagreements. For certain social ties—between attorney and client, 
doctor and patient, priest and penitent—the law does take steps to insulate 
Bob from having his information passed through Alice, in the interest of 
maintaining the sanctity and confidence of those socially important 
relations.34 The law acknowledges that society benefits when people are 
able to place themselves in positions of extreme vulnerability vis-à-vis 
one another, and weighs that benefit over access to those confidences for 
evidentiary purposes.35 In some cases, the protection afforded to 
privileged communications is so strong that it cannot be waived even if 
one party wishes to testify against another.36 Despite this, in other cases, 
 
32. Arvind Narayanan et al., A Critical Look at Decentralized Personal Data Architectures, DATA 
USAGE MGMT. ON WEB 1 (2012), http://dig.csail.mit.edu/2012/WWW-
DUMW/papers/dumw2012_submission_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4EK-NRPK].  
33. For example, Matera v. Google centered on Google’s automated scanning of non-Gmail-users’ 
messages when they sent email to a Gmail account. Google scanned the messages in order to target 
ads to users. Matera v. Google Inc., No. 15-CV-04062-LHK, 2017 WL 1365021 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 
2017). Here, Google had access to the nonusers’ messages by virtue of their communication with 
Gmail users. Id. at *2. The case eventually settled when Google agreed to stop scanning these 
messages for advertising purposes; however, Google still scans nonusers’ emails for spam and 
malware detection and to generate Smart Replies. Brian Fung, Gmail Will No Longer Snoop on Your 
Emails for Advertising Purposes, WASH. POST (June 26, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/06/26/gmail-will-no-longer-snoop-on-
your-emails-for-advertising-purposes/ [https://perma.cc/56WT-LTNP]. 
34. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 223 
(1839) (preventing a wife’s testimony against her husband in order to protect “the enjoyment of that 
confidence which should subsist between those who are connected by the nearest and dearest relations 
of life. To break down or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of husband and wife, 
would be to destroy the best solace of human existence”). 
35. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 
(1958) (“The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or husband against 
wife . . . was a belief that such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only for the benefit 
of [the family], but for the benefit of the public as well.”). 
36. The privilege for confidential communications in marriage has been so treated. See, e.g., United 
States v. Neal, 532 F. Supp. 942, 946 (D. Colo. 1982) (barring a wife who desired to testify as to 
 
04 Barocas and Levy (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/20 1:12 PM 
2020] PRIVACY DEPENDENCIES 567 
 
the law sometimes exploits passthrough-based disclosures. The third-
party doctrine—which holds that individuals have no constitutional 
expectation of privacy in information they have voluntarily given to 
another—was originally justified by the premise that being “betrayed by 
an informer . . . [is] inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the 
kind of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak.”37 But many legal 
scholars have opined that the doctrine makes less sense given the ubiquity 
of platform-mediated communication, in which we have virtually no 
choice but to pass information through Observers (who may then, 
voluntarily or compulsorily, share that information with the 
government).38 
2. Bycatch 
In commercial fishing, bycatch refers to those species caught 
unintentionally that are not the species being targeted—dolphins in tuna 
nets, seabirds, undersized fish, and the like.39 Though fisheries can take 
steps to try to reduce bycatch, contemporary fishing technology makes 
some degree of incidental bycatch unavoidable. While in some cases, non-
target species can be returned to the ocean unharmed, many others perish 
in the course of being captured or are subsequently discarded.40 Data 
collection bears similarity to commercial fishing: Bob may be “caught in 
the net” when Alice’s data are targeted for collection. 
This collection may be foreseeable but incidental: Bob may be a 
bystander in a photograph taken of Alice, in which the photographer has 
no real intent to capture Bob’s image.41 This concern has come to the fore 
recently in debates over the risks and benefits of police body-worn 
cameras, and whether the public should have access to the footage they 
capture—which may contain substantial personal information about crime 
victims, witnesses, and bystanders in addition to that of officers and 
defendants. Jurisdictions that require body-worn cameras have attempted 
 
marital communications with her husband from doing so, in the interest of preventing the government 
from “invad[ing] the confidences of marriage to turn those nearest and dearest into informers”).  
37. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
38. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting 
that the third-party doctrine “is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks”).  
39. Martin A. Hall, On Bycatches, 6 REVS. FISH BIOLOGY & FISHERIES 319, 321 (1996). 
40. Id. 
41. See, e.g., Roberto Hoyle et al., Privacy Behaviors of Lifeloggers Using Wearable Cameras, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2014 ACM INT’L JOINT CONFERENCE ON PERVASIVE & UBIQUITOUS 
COMPUTING 571, 572 (2014) (investigating how bystanders respond to the presence of lifelogging 
devices and the willingness of lifeloggers to respect the privacy of bystanders). 
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to strike a balance between releasing data relevant to “target” individuals 
and protecting the privacy of others in the frame of such video, commonly 
through redaction and restrictions on public access.42 
Bycatch can also occur when Alice and Bob share physical space. 
Perhaps Bob is a short-term guest in Alice’s home, which Alice has 
equipped with smart devices that capture video, audio, or other types of 
data (say, an Amazon Echo or a Nest Cam).43 Bob’s data may be captured, 
processed, and transmitted alongside Alice’s back to the vendor of the 
device, very likely without Bob’s knowledge or consent—but also, 
perhaps, without the Observer’s specific intent to capture data about Bob. 
Of course, sometimes Alice intends for the Observer to see Bob in the 
footage. Alice might want a home security camera to transmit Bob’s 
doings in Alice’s home to the company that provides the equipment—or 
on to the police. Amazon’s Ring video doorbells, for example, transmit 
recordings back to the company for storage and processing.44 Notably, 
Ring includes a companion app called Neighbors that allows users to 
share information collected from their device with others in the 
neighborhood, specifically via Amazon,45 and Amazon may, in turn, pass 
this information on to the police.46 
Or perhaps the Observer takes a photo of Alice, knowing that it will 
capture Bob in the background. The Observer might enlist Alice’s help in 
snapping a less conspicuous picture of Bob by making it appear that the 
Observer is only interested in Alice. People routinely employ this tactic 
when trying to photograph celebrities without their express consent or 
notice—a kind of reverse photobombing.47 
Given these risks, we might expect the Observer to take special steps 
to alert Bob to the possibility that his information might be swept up with 
Alice’s. For example, vendors may design devices in such a way that 
makes Alice’s choice to install or use the devices highly conspicuous to 
 
42. See Bryce C. Newell, Collateral Visibility: A Socio-Legal Study of Police Body Camera 
Adoption, Privacy, and Public Disclosure in Washington State, 92 IND. L.J. 1329 (2017); Mary D. 
Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395 (2016). 
43. Eric Zeng, Shrirang Mare & Franziska Roesner, End User Security and Privacy Concerns with Smart 
Homes, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY 65 (2017). 
44. Ring Smart Doorbell Cameras, RING, https://shop.ring.com/pages/doorbell-cameras 
[https://perma.cc/3EJV-5JMN]. 
45. Neighbors by Ring, RING, https://shop.ring.com/pages/neighbors [https://perma.cc/H9UP-CS6X]. 
46. Kate Cox, It’s the User’s Fault if a Ring Camera Violates Your Privacy, Amazon Says, 
ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 20, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/11/cops-can-keep-ring-
footage-forever-share-it-with-anyone-amazon-confirms [https://perma.cc/N6V8-N9FS]. 
47. Gordon Fletcher & Anita Greenhill, Photobombing: Mobility, Humour and Culture, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON CULTURAL ATTITUDES TOWARD COMMUNICATION AND 
TECHNOLOGY 198–206 (2010). 
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Bob.48 A bright red light may draw Bob’s attention to the device, alerting 
him to the fact that he is being recorded. In other cases, the burden might 
be placed on Alice to make sure that the implications of her choices are 
apparent to Bob. Ring, for example, “includes a door/window sticker in 
the box with each device that is equipped with audiovisual recording 
capabilities,” enjoining—but not requiring—customers to use these 
visuals to alert people who might be captured by the device.49 Likewise, 
the decision to install a smart device in a multi-occupant home may rest 
with one resident—Alice—even when it implicates others’ privacy. In 
practice, Bob rarely has any say in Alice’s decision.50 
In some special cases, the law has viewed each occupant as having an 
important claim to preserving the privacy of a shared space. In nursing 
homes, for example, family members often want to be able to monitor 
their loved ones remotely, via webcam—even when residents share 
rooms. State statutes that address nursing home monitoring require that a 
resident’s roommates consent to monitoring, often allowing them to place 
limits on its use (e.g., restricting the times of day a camera is on) or to 
switch rooms if they do not consent.51 In this case, Alice’s relatives’ 
interests are not allowed to trump Bob’s privacy concern.52 
Others have proposed alternative legal approaches to protect 
“secondary users.”53 For example, companies could be required to 
distinguish between the data of primary users (who ostensibly consented 
to data collection) and secondary users whose data were collected 
incidentally. Secondary user data might be subject to shorter data 
retention periods; the sale of data to third parties that includes secondary 
 
48. See Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (And Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1027 (2012) (proposing means of providing visceral notice of privacy-invasive technologies). 
49. Letter from Amazon to Sen. Edward Markey (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.markey.senate. 
gov/imo/media/doc/Response%20Letter_Ring_Senator%20Markey%2011.01.2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C2JY-VQE7].  
50. See Christine Geeng & Franziska Roesner, Who’s In Control? Interactions in Multi-User Smart 
Homes, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING 
SYSTEMS 268 (2019) (“[R]oommates resolve conflicts by deferring to the default control and agency 
of the device’s installer or owner, a recurring theme in our findings.”).  
51. Lipton, supra note 53, at 422–24.  
52. Levy et al., supra note 18, at 352–55. In practice, however, these laws may not be effective 
means of protecting roommates’ privacy, as they often depend on frequent adjustments that may not 
be realistic to enact in understaffed nursing homes. Id. at 354–55. 
53. Alex B. Lipton, Privacy Protections for Secondary Users of Communication-Capturing 
Technologies, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 396 (2016) (discussing inefficacy of current privacy regimes for 
protecting the interests of secondary users). See generally Mariella Dimiccoli et al., Mitigating 
Bystander Privacy Concerns in Egocentric Activity Recognition with Deep Learning and Intentional 
Image Degradation, 1 PROC. ACM ON INTERACTIVE, MOBILE, WEARABLE & UBIQUITOUS TECHS. 
(2018) (proposing technical means of blurring bystanders’ faces in photos). See also Meg L. Jones, 
Privacy Without Screens & the Internet of Other People’s Things, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 639 (2014). 
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users might be prohibited; and secondary users’ data might be 
anonymized using various technical methods. 
But for the most part, the law does not vest Bob with privacy 
protections when he is caught up in the net of Alice’s data. Fourth 
Amendment standing doctrine maintains that a defendant may only 
challenge a search when one’s own person or property are searched, under 
the justification that one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
person or property of another person.54 Bob has no recourse, then, against 
a warrantless search of Alice’s car that happens to reveal incriminating 
evidence about Bob—regardless of whether Alice’s own privacy rights 
were violated in the course of the search.55 The same logic has been 
applied to “incidental overhear” of electronic communications with 
targets of lawful surveillance. In United States v. Hasbajrami,56 the 
Second Circuit held that a U.S. resident had no Fourth Amendment 
interest in his emails with a foreign person targeted under section 702 of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, despite the fact that such 
collection would foreseeably capture the communications of people other 
than the target.57 
Ironically, respecting Bob’s privacy when he appears alongside Alice 
may require that Alice make herself uniquely identifiable: to ensure that 
no one but Alice’s data are captured, an Observer may use biometric tools 
(like face or voice recognition) to distinguish Alice from anyone else. But 
doing so creates a “privacy-privacy tradeoff” in which Alice must render 
more information about herself for Bob’s privacy to be protected.58 
3. Identification 
We can also identify an unknown Bob by virtue of his connection to a 
known Alice. In familial search procedures, unidentified DNA evidence 
 
54. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
55. Id. 
56. 945 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 2019). 
57. Id. at 662–64. In the foreign surveillance context, data minimization requirements are intended 
to “to some degree compensate for the possibility of broad incidental collection.” PRIVACY & CIVIL 
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 116 (July 2, 2014), 
https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC6N-LLBY]. Indeed, in 
Hasbajrami, while the court found that Hasbajrami had no Fourth Amendment interest in the 
incidental collection of his emails, it left open the question of whether querying a database of 
incidentally collected communications violated Hasbajrami’s privacy interests. Id. at 646. 
58. David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 229 (2016) (discussing 
cases in which privacy in one respect is traded off against privacy in another—including cases in 
which “privacy burdens or benefits [shift] from one group . . . to another”). Privacy-privacy trade-
offs are their own kind of dependency, in which Alice must be willing to sacrifice her own privacy to 
maintain Bob’s. In addition to trading off against Alice’s privacy, incentivizing companies to develop 
better biometric recognition tools may impose additional net costs on consumers and their privacy. 
See Lipton, supra note 53, at 423. 
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from a crime scene is compared to identified DNA samples in order to 
assess whether a person genetically related to (i.e., a family member of) 
someone of known identity is likely to have committed the crime in 
question.59 Here, genetic ties are the basis for dependency: Bob’s 
identification by law enforcement rests on Alice’s (voluntary or 
involuntary) provision of her own DNA. In some cases, Alice’s DNA is 
collected strategically in order to confirm suspicion of a particular Bob. 
The “BTK” serial murderer, Dennis Rader, was identified based on a 
match between crime scene evidence and his daughter’s DNA, collected 
without her knowledge by police from a Pap smear she had at a state 
university hospital five years earlier;60 police already suspected Rader of 
the murders based on other evidence, and his daughter’s DNA sample 
confirmed their suspicions.61 And an arrest recently made in the long-cold 
case of the Golden State Killer, who raped and murdered numerous 
victims in California between 1976 and 1986, was based in large part on 
comparing unidentified crime-scene DNA to a sample submitted to a 
genealogy website.62 
Increasingly, DNA samples from crime scenes are run “blind” against 
large databases of samples from those convicted or arrested without 
 
59. Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L.R. 291 
(2010); see also Danah Boyd & Karen Levy, Networked Rights and Networked Harms (working 
paper, Mar. 14, 2016) (on file with author). 
60. Ellen Nakashima, From DNA of Family, A Tool to Make Arrests, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/20/AR2008042002388.html 
[https://perma.cc/6SKC-VLNB]. 
61. Mark Hansen, How the Cops Caught BTK, A.B.A. J. (May 1, 2006), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
magazine/article/how_the_cops_caught_btk/ [https://perma.cc/6TU3-FRUL].  
62. Sam Stanton, Relative’s DNA from Genealogy Websites Cracked East Area Rapist Case, DA’s 
Office Says, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 26, 2018), http://www.sacbee.com/latest-
news/article209913514.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2020). Before the arrest, Michelle McNamara, who 
investigated the Golden State Killer’s case for years, lamented the fact that genealogy websites had 
to date failed to cooperate with law enforcement efforts. Jeva Lange, Michelle McNamara’s 
Tantalizing Roadmap for Finding a Long Lost Serial Killer, WEEK (Mar. 19, 2018), 
http://theweek.com/articles/761206/michelle-mcnamaras-tantalizing-roadmap-finding-long-lost-
serial-killer [https://perma.cc/GA2Z-MDNL] (“The most frustrating detail of all is that police have 
the Golden State Killer’s DNA, but they can only compare it to DNA in their database of criminals 
convicted of felonies—where there are, naturally, no hits. There are other DNA databases in 
existence, though: 23andMe has 1.5 million people’s profiles, and Ancestry.com has 2.5 million. 
‘Unfortunately,’ write McNamara’s editors, ‘neither company will work with law enforcement, citing 
privacy issues and their terms of service.’ Yet ‘[i]f we could just submit the killer’s actual genetic 
material . . . to one of these databases, the odds are great that we would find a second or third cousin 
and that person would lead investigators to the killer’s identity.’”). Those databases have since grown 
to about 5 million and 10 million profiles, respectively. Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden 
State Killer is Tracked Through a Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-genealogy.html 
[https://perma.cc/E9DG-FR8Y]. 
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conviction,63 without particularized suspicion as to the suspect’s identity. 
Here, establishing a relationship between a crime-scene sample and a 
known Alice in the database serves as an investigative tool to locate likely 
perpetrators.64 In each case, the genetic link between Alice and Bob allows 
an Observer (here, the state) to identify Bob through Bob’s connection to 
Alice—because Bob is unknown to the Observer, or because direct access 
to Bob is legally or practically unavailable. 
Traditional police work also exploits this possibility all the time, 
initiating the search for an unknown suspect by investigating the suspect’s 
known associates. Consider the following situation: Alice and Bob appear 
in surveillance footage together. The police recognize Alice by sight, 
given their prior interactions with her, but they do not recognize Bob, 
given his lack of criminal history. Yet simply observing Alice and Bob 
together gives the police a clue about Bob’s identity because the police 
will exploit their knowledge of Alice to identify Bob—her 
apparent  associate. 
Social networks follow a similar strategy when they try to identify the 
people that appear in uploaded photos using facial recognition technology. 
Rather than attempting to match someone’s face to the face of all users on 
the social network (which may include many millions of people), service 
providers will frequently limit the set of possible candidates to the known 
associates of the person who has uploaded the photo (which is more likely 
to be in the hundreds). Limiting the candidate pool makes the task of 
comparing faces much less challenging, computationally speaking, and 
 
63. Solomon Moore, F.B.I. and States Vastly Expand DNA Databases, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/us/19DNA.html [https://perma.cc/5NGE-CLRH]. Forensic 
DNA databases significantly overrepresent Black and Latino individuals due to disparities in arrest 
and imprisonment, leading to concerns about further racial profiling and deepening inequities in 
criminal justice contact rates. See Peter A. Chow-White & Troy Duster, Do Health and Forensic DNA 
Databases Increase Racial Disparities?, 8 PLOS MED. (2011). 
64. Recent scholarship has explored the constitutionality of such procedures. See David Kaye, The 
Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of “Familial Searching”, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109 
(2013); Murphy, supra note 59. Practicing lawyers have begun to raise such objections, as in the 2019 
case of Jesse Bjerke, identified through familial search as the prime suspect in a 2016 rape in 
Alexandria, Virginia. Bjerke’s defense attorney sought to have the DNA evidence that lead to his 
identification excluded, arguing that the act of extracting genetic information from Bjerke’s discarded 
materials constituted a search that should have required a warrant. Note that his attorney did not raise 
a constitutional challenge to the search against the genetic database (i.e., against others’ data); the 
focus was on the collection of his own data. To date, lawyers have not tested the constitutionality of 
the matching process itself. Rachel Weiner, Alexandria Rape Suspect Challenging DNA Search Used 
to Crack Case, WASH. POST (June 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-
safety/alexandria-rape-suspect-challenging-dna-search-used-to-crack-case/2019/06/10/24bd0e34-
87a5-11e9-a870-b9c411dc4312_story.html [https://perma.cc/D94T-7RXH]. For now, the police’s 
ability to perform familial searches is only limited by the terms of service set by the operators of 
genetic databases, which has been a major point of controversy. States like Maryland have begun to 
consider legislation that addresses this problem head-on. Megan Molteni, Should Cops Use Family 
Tree Forensics? Maryland Isn’t So Sure, WIRED (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://www.wired.com/story/maryland-considers-banning-genetic-genealogy-forensics/ 
[https://perma.cc/WV8R-NJUG]. 
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cuts down on the risk of false matches, which grows as more candidates 
are considered.65 To return to our familiar characters, the social network 
might exploit the fact that Bob belongs to Alice’s articulated social 
network—that they are “friends”—to increase the likelihood of correctly 
matching a face in one of Alice’s uploaded photos to Bob. Because users 
are more likely to take photographs of and with their friends than with 
strangers, facial recognition is markedly improved when it integrates 
information about a user’s social network.66 Knowing that Alice and Bob 
are friends makes it far easier for a social network to identify Bob by sight 
when he appears in Alice’s photos. 
4. Tie-Justified Observation 
Social ties between Alice and Bob may be used to justify expanding 
the scope of surveillance from an initial focus on Alice to also include 
Bob. Here, the Observer’s aim is often to build a broadly inclusive 
database rather than to learn about any specific user; in other words, the 
value of observing Alice stems from Alice’s connection to many Bobs, 
rather than to a specific Bob. For example, the National Security Agency’s 
bulk telephony metadata program relied on a practice known as “contact-
chaining,” analyzing phone records that were up to three degrees of 
separation—or “hops”—out from a suspected terrorist.67 Effectively, this 
allowed the NSA to collect data from about 20 million people for each 
initial target.68 (In 2014, President Obama limited the scope of inquiry to 
two degrees of separation away from a suspect seed—approximately 
25,000 people per suspect.)69 The three-hop (and then two-hop) rule relied 
explicitly on a network tie between Alice and Bob as a justification for 
data collection about Bob. 
 
65. Lucas Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Facial Recognition Technology: A Survey of Policy and 
Implementation Issues, CTR. CATASTROPHE PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE 3 (2009), 
https://nissenbaum.tech.cornell.edu/papers/facial_recognition_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FSB-PJ9D] 
(“Given that the number of possible images that enter the gallery as near-identical mathematical 
representations (biometric doubles) increases as the size of the gallery increases, restricting the size of the 
gallery . . . may help maintain the integrity of the system and increase overall performance.”). 
66. ZAK STONE ET AL., AUTOTAGGING FACEBOOK: SOCIAL NETWORK CONTEXT IMPROVES PHOTO 
ANNOTATION, IEEE COMPUTER VISION & PATTERN RECOGNITION WORKSHOPS (2008).  
67.  David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT’L SEC’Y L. & POL’Y 209 (2014). 
68. Amy Nordrum, NSA Can Legally Access Metadata of 25,000 Callers Based on a Single 
Suspect’s Phone, IEEE SPECTRUM (May 16, 2016), https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-
talk/telecom/security/nsa-can-legally-access-metadata-of-25000-callers-based-on-a-single-suspects-
phone-analysis-suggests [https://perma.cc/H7AB-SN4H].  
69. Id. Even under the two-hop rule, targeting only 1% of individuals allows the observer access to 
46% of all communications in the network. Laura Radaelli et al., Quantifying Surveillance in the 
Networked Age: Node-based Intrusions and Group Privacy, ARXIV (2018), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.09007.pdf [https://perma.cc/J33D-GLSF]. 
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Online social networks often use social ties to set conditions of 
visibility for their users. For example, Facebook’s former privacy settings 
were premised on network structure: a previous default setting allowed 
friends of your friends (i.e., people two degrees from a given person) to 
see certain components of that person’s profile.70 The company employed 
the same reasoning in determining which information would be available 
to other actors on the platform: at one point, third-party apps were allowed 
to collect data from a consenting user’s (presumably non-consenting) 
friends. In the Cambridge Analytica scandal, 270,000 Facebook users 
took a personality quiz through a Facebook app; the app then collected 
personal data not only from those directly observed users, but also from 
those users’ friends—widening the net to an estimated 87 million 
indirectly observed users.71 
Tie-justified observation allows the Observer to learn about many Bobs 
because they happen to be connected to Alice. Two- or three-hop searches 
justified by such connections can give Observers permission to learn 
about far more Bobs than one might expect if the social network includes 
a number of high-degree nodes—that is, a person in the network that has 
a particularly large number of connections.72 If Alice only has a small 
number of friends, but Bob has a huge number of friends, Alice’s 
connection to Bob would allow an Observer to justify searching Bob’s far 
larger network as well. And if a large proportion of a social network is 
less than two or three hops from someone like Bob, an Observer might 
find that they are able to investigate most of the network without having 
to make any further hops. Effectively, tie-justified observation can easily 
create a dragnet, in which the number of observed parties far exceeds the 
number of initial targets.  
In the most sympathetic reading, an ostensible justification for such 
collection is that researchers interested in issues involving social 
networks—information contagion, the influence of network position on 
behavior, etc.—can learn much about Alice from learning about those to 
whom she is connected; in this sense, collection of information about the 
Bobs to whom Alice is connected is a way of deepening the Observer’s 
knowledge of Alice. In the NSA contact-chaining case, for example, 
expanding the scope of surveillance from merely a target to a target’s 
 
70. Grimmelmann, supra note 5, at 1158. 
71. David C. Vladeck, Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, and the Regulator’s Dilemma: Clueless or 
Venal?, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/facebook-cambridge-
analytica-and-the-regulators-dilemma-clueless-or-venal/ [https://perma.cc/3GH2-VUZ6]. 
72. The existence of high-degree hubs (like voicemail services with millions of users) facilitates 
the scale of observation premised on network tie by creating a large number of new routes to 
observation via a single phone number. Jonathan Mayer, MetaPhone: The NSA Three-Hop, WEB 
POL’Y BLOG (Dec. 9, 2013), http://webpolicy.org/2013/12/09/metaphone-the-nsa-three-hop/ 
[https://perma.cc/N4CA-Q526]. 
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associates (and those associates’ associates) was controversially justified 
by virtue of the relevance of those parties’ communications to the target.73 
But this expansive notion of relevance was used to justify even wider 
observation: that associates of a known suspect are likely to have 
additional associates of their own who are worthy of suspicion. Collecting 
such information was seen as necessary to uncover a coordinating group 
of suspects (for example, a terrorist cell).74 However, in its review of the 
program, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board argued that too 
many “hops” reduces the relevance of the average tie to the initial target, 
effectively amounting to dragnet collection.75 
* * * 
Observation premised on tie varies in terms of the nature of the 
association between Alice and Bob (genetic; articulated; based on 
physical proximity or communication), the intentionality with which 
Bob’s data are observed via Alice (from incidentally being “caught in the 
net” of observing Alice, on one end of the spectrum, to purposive and 
coercive circumvention of obstacles to observing Bob directly, on the 
other), and the specificity with which Bob is targeted by the Observer 
(whose goal may be to obtain information about a particular Bob or to 
build a broad social graph of many Bobs). But in all cases, the Observer 
learns about Bob by “piggybacking” on the tie between Alice and Bob. 
Tie-based dependencies tend to implicate the perceived sanctity of our 
relations with family and friends; our connections to other people, 
whether severable or persistent, ought not be the source of unconstrained 
and unanticipated privacy violation. The notion that law enforcement 
 
73. Robert Chesney, Telephony Metadata: Is the Contact-Chaining Program Unsalvageable?, 
LAWFARE BLOG (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/telephony-metadata-contact-
chaining-program-unsalvageable [https://perma.cc/8NMK-9JSV] (explaining expansion of bulk 
collection program from “records [pertaining] directly to the agent of a foreign power as defined in 
FISA, as opposed to spouses, friends or others whose records might well be relevant too[]” to 
authority where “materials did not belong to or pertain to the particular target (and thus the provision 
might be used to gather records about an associate of the target)” (emphasis added)). Id. Chesney 
goes on to note the faultiness of the relevance justification, which the government argued justified 
collection of an entire comprehensive database as necessary to enable contact-chaining. Id. 
74. ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER, BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER 
SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 4 (Aug. 9, 2013), https://fas.org/irp/nsa/bulk-215.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QC9B-LJGL] (“Following the trail [via contact-chaining] . . . allows focused 
inquiries on numbers of interest, thus potentially revealing a contact at the second or third ‘hop’ from 
the seed telephone number that connects to a different terrorist-associated telephone number already 
known to the analyst.”). 
75. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS 
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS 
OF THE FISC 171 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/215 Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_P
rogram.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6DE-RPVB] (“Each additional hop from the original ‘selector’ makes 
the connection more remote and adds exponentially greater numbers of ‘false positives’ to the query 
results. The value of connections becomes more limited as the contact chain is extended and it 
becomes more difficult to sift through the results.”). 
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might exploit our families’ genetic linkages to us, or that a social network 
might seize upon our articulated friendships to glean our data, may strike 
us as a profane intrusion into sacred territory. When surveillance is 
premised on whom you know, we are concerned about the degree to which 
it impinges on your right to associate freely.76 
As explained, some information leakage through our relationships is an 
inevitable side effect of social life—but social norms and interpersonal 
sanctions have long been relied upon as adequate regulatory mechanisms 
to restrict unwelcome exposure. Close social ties can both limit and 
facilitate disclosure, and relationships may operate under the “shadow” 
influence of a potential Observer. But these considerations do not apply 
when Alice’s disclosure about Bob is unknowing or involuntary—Dennis 
Rader’s daughter almost surely did not consider that her Pap smear would 
eventually provide incriminating evidence against her father;77 Cambridge 
Analytica’s quiz-takers are unlikely to have considered the privacy 
interests of their friends when they divulged their data.78 When 
observation depends on the existence of a connection between Alice and 
Bob rather than on disclosure of the particular information they share 
(e.g., the NSA’s collection of telephony metadata rather than content), the 
notion that social norms will limit disclosure is similarly weak.79 
B. Similarity 
Inference provides yet another—and more circuitous—route to learn 
about Bob through Alice. When Alice discloses information about herself, 
she may reveal certain things about Bob as well, if Bob is understood to 
be similar to Alice. That is, the Observer might conclude that Bob likely 
shares the trait disclosed by Alice if the Observer already knows that Alice 
 
76. Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment 
Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 745 (2008). 
77. Natalie Ram suggests looking to the law of tenancy by the entirety for a framework on how to 
reconcile multiple (and potentially divergent) interests in shared genetic information. Like genetic relations, 
tenancy by the entirety is a form of property right in which ownership inheres neither in one spouse nor the 
other, but in the couple together. Ram draws from this arrangement by analogy in proposing a framework 
for genetic data. See Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (2015). 
78. David Vladeck’s argument that friends should be seen as users too: “The FTC’s investigation 
will focus on a user’s reasonable expectations – that is, what did users and their friends understand 
their ‘privacy’ settings to mean? Were users clearly and unmistakably informed that permitting 
sharing with friends meant broad and virtually unrestricted access to their data by third parties? Did 
the ‘friends’ understand the breadth of third-party access to their data based on decisions that others 
made?” Vladeck, supra note 71. 
79. Despite this, Facebook makes an implausible appeal to norms when urging users to upload their 
contact lists, informing users on the “Learn More” screen that “You may have business or personal 
contacts in your phone . . . . Please only send friend requests to people you know personally who 
would welcome the invite.” Kashmir Hill, How Facebook Figures Out Everyone You’ve Ever Met, 
GIZMODO (Nov. 7, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/how-facebook-figures-out-everyone-youve-ever-
met-1819822691 [https://perma.cc/L9FD-MVK8]. 
04 Barocas and Levy (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/20 1:12 PM 
2020] PRIVACY DEPENDENCIES 577 
 
and Bob resemble each other in many other respects. In this case, the 
Observer has drawn an inductive inference from its encounter with 
Alice—that people with a certain set of observable characteristics will 
also have the disclosed trait. When confronted by Bob, the Observer might 
recognize that Bob shares these observable characteristics and that Bob is 
therefore likely to have this additional, unobserved trait as well. Note that 
the Observer needs to know something about Bob in order to apply lessons 
that it has drawn from Alice and others—that is, whether Bob possesses 
those characteristics that have tended to correlate with the trait in question 
among other people the Observer has encountered in the past. Unlike 
information about the sought-after trait, these characteristics might be 
much more readily observed or more freely disclosed. In fact, these 
characteristics might be difficult or impossible to conceal or they might 
seem much more innocuous and thus less worthy of privacy protection.80 
This allows the Observer to sidestep the task—and associated difficulties 
and discomforts—of observing or asking about the trait directly; instead, 
the Observer can make a statistically-motivated guess that Bob is likely to 
follow the same pattern as other people with his same observable 
characteristics.81 The ability to draw and apply such inferences means that 
Alice’s disclosures can implicate those similar to her. And it means that 
observations of Alice can be brought to bear on others who happen to 
share other known characteristics. 
We might understand this dynamic as a form of generalizing, profiling, 
or stereotyping, where the expectations that the Observer might have 
about Bob depend on general lessons drawn from particular examples 
involving many similar Alices. After interacting with many lawyers, for 
example, an Observer might draw the general conclusion that all lawyers 
are dishonest. Upon learning that Bob is a lawyer, the Observer might 
doubt his honesty, too, even though the Observer has no personal 
experience with him lying. While this conclusion might feel unfounded or 
objectionable, inductive reasoning of this sort is foundational to human 
cognition: observations about a specific individual are always made 
meaningful against a backdrop of experience with others.82 Learning that 
someone is a lawyer is of no significance to the Observer unless the 
 
80. Solon Barocas, Panic Inducing: Data Mining, Fairness, and Privacy 73–74 (2014) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with authors). 
81. See Solon Barocas, Leaps and Bounds: Toward a Normative Theory of Inferential Privacy 17–
21 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
82. FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 65–67 (2009). 
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Observer can channel its prior history with lawyers to give substance to 
the category.83 
Years ago, Tal Zarsky pointed out that a customer who reveals their 
shopping patterns on a website may implicate a non-customer who shares 
the customer’s gender, wealth, and zip code because the website can use 
a model to infer that the non-customer will have similar shopping 
preferences.84 Any individual’s privacy ultimately depends on what 
similar people are willing to disclose or what has otherwise been learned 
about them.85 In prior work, we showed that this dynamic can lead to a 
tyranny of the minority, whereby a small number of willing disclosers 
might determine what observers can then infer about the broader 
populations to which they belong.86 Even if a majority of people abstain 
from disclosing such details or go out of their way to evade observation, 
the minority of people who happily give up some information may allow 
observers to uncover the more easily observable or readily disclosed facts 
that serve as reliable proxies for the sought-after details.87 
In many respects, this is the goal of a well-executed scientific study: 
drawing generally applicable conclusions from a limited sample.88 When 
 
83. Of course, the stereotype could also have little or nothing to do with the Observer’s experience 
with Alice and those like her. Instead, the stereotype might reflect the Observer’s prejudices and 
biases, loosely connected to or completely detached from any personal encounters with Alice and 
others like her—gross generalizations or unfounded conclusions. Such stereotypes are rarely learned 
from direct contact with people so stereotyped; rather, stereotypes tend to gain purchase and their 
broader cultural force through everyday communication and media representations. Even so, the 
Observer’s ability to assign significance to certain attributes held by Bob will depend on the assertions 
and representations that others have made about people like Alice. 
84. Tal Z. Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using Implementation-Based Solutions for the 
Troubles of Information Privacy in the Age of Data Mining and the Internet Society, 56 ME. L. REV. 
13, 43–44 (2004) (describing how one customer who reveals his shopping patterns on a website may 
implicate a non-customer who shares the customer’s gender, wealth, and zip code, because the website 
can use a model to infer that the non-customer will have similar shopping preferences). Mark 
MacCarthy has likewise explained that “[d]ata from people who have revealed information about 
themselves through surveys, transactions, and other voluntary disclosures are part of the evidentiary 
basis for the knowledge revealed by [data mining] techniques. But they apply to other people who 
have never disclosed that information about themselves.” MacCarthy, supra note 20, at 425. 
85. Fairfield & Engel, supra note 10, at 405 (“Aggregated data contributions serve to train machine learning 
algorithms, such that the data offered by one person trains an algorithm that impacts someone else.”). 
86. Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run around Anonymity and Consent, in 
PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 44, 61–63 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014). 
87. Id. 
88. In fact, principles from research ethics demand that researchers enlist the minimal number of 
research subjects necessary to produce reliable and generalizable findings. Bruno M. Cesana & Paolo 
Antonelli, Sample Size Calculations in Clinical Research Should Also Be Based on Ethical Principles, 
17 TRIALS 149, 149 (2016) (“Most statistical methods implemented in controlled clinical trials 
(CCTs) have the aim of reducing the number of enrolled patients. This aim not only meets the a priori 
imperative of exposing the minimum number of patients to the burdens of a trial but also fulfills the 
a posteriori imperative that as few patients as possible are administered the treatment that proves to 
be inferior.” (footnote omitted)); see also Peter Bacchetti et al., Ethics and Sample Size, 161 AM. J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 105, 106 (2005). 
04 Barocas and Levy (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/20 1:12 PM 
2020] PRIVACY DEPENDENCIES 579 
 
the voluntary disclosures of a willing group of research subjects benefit a 
broader population, these benefits could be viewed as positive 
externalities. When these discoveries place others’ privacy at risk, the 
same results could be considered negative externalities. In the first case, 
Bob might benefit from Alice’s decision to participate in a medical study 
that results in findings applicable to Bob because he shares relevant 
characteristics with Alice. In the second case, Bob may lose the ability to 
withhold certain information about himself because Alice has divulged 
certain medical details and because Bob shares the readily observable 
characteristics discovered to correlate with Alice’s disclosed condition. 
Of course, the same discovery could play both roles at the same time—
helping Bob in some cases and harming him in others.89 
In most cases, Bob will have no way of keeping Alice from disclosing 
details that implicate him. Nor will he have any way to prevent the 
Observer from using Alice’s disclosures to draw inferences about him.90 
And yet differences in the dimensions through which the Observer views 
Alice and Bob as similar can have profound implications for the perceived 
legitimacy of these inferences. Ultimately, generalizations, profiles, and 
stereotypes all rest on identifying what is relevantly similar about the 
people who exhibit some quality. The basis upon which a person is 
understood to be similar can feel extremely proximate or quite distant. At 
their closest, inferences about your character might depend upon the 
company you keep. Or inferences might depend on the socially salient 
characteristics that you share with others (e.g., gender, race, and age), but 
with whom you hold no explicit social ties. More distantly, inferences 
might rest on characteristics that have little social salience (e.g., your 
 
89. This differs from traditional concerns about “group privacy,” which have focused on the risks 
of reporting aggregate statistics from research studies, especially those involving stigmatized medical 
conditions. If Alice and Bob are known to have participated in a study, then even general statements 
about the research population can reveal something about them. For example, reporting that 40% of 
the population suffers from depression means that an Observer can now make a reasoned guess that 
Alice and Bob have a 40% chance of being depressed. If researchers further report the different rates 
at which men and women in the study suffer from depression, then the Observer can use Alice and 
Bob’s gender to make an even more precise guess about their probability of being depressed. Now 
consider what happens if researchers present these as generalizable findings rather than aggregate 
statistics about a particular set of research subjects. Suddenly, all men and women might be subject 
to this inference as well, even if they were not involved in the study. See MacCarthy, supra note 20, 
at 458 (describing concerns that medical testing on individual Ashkenazi Jews, who gave voluntary 
consent, could negatively implicate anyone from such group, because the results could be applied to 
stigmatize Ashkenazi Jews more generally). 
90. See, e.g., Sandra Wachter & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking 
Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 494, 543 (2019) 
(explaining how the GDPR fails to provide meaningful protection against inference). 
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preferred web browser91) but nevertheless distinguish the group to which 
you belong from others with respect to the sought-after quality. In each 
case, making sense of any particular observation or disclosure ultimately 
depends on inferences rendered on the basis of knowledge about others. 
And yet, how we are seen as relevantly similar will often dictate whether 
we are willing to accept or tolerate the resulting inference. 
1. The Company You Keep 
Consider the inferential bridge that social relationships might provide 
an Observer. We might infer, for example, that members of the same 
family are likely to resemble one another along some dimension (“the 
apple doesn’t fall far from the tree”). Given the Observer’s knowledge 
about Alice and the discovery that Bob is Alice’s son, the Observer might 
conclude that Bob is likely to possess many of the same qualities that 
Alice is known to possess. Such reasoning might rest on the knowledge 
that certain traits are hereditary, but it could also depend on the belief that 
parents impart certain qualities to their children through their upbringing. 
The COMPAS tool—the subject of a well-known ProPublica 
investigation of “machine bias”92—asks defendants about the criminal 
history of their parents to help predict whether they are likely to recidivate 
if released pending trial.93 This might seem like a straightforward case of 
punishing the child for the sins of a parent. But the relevant point of 
similarity is not only that Alice and Bob are related, but that other parents 
have tended to pass along these qualities to their children as well. In other 
words, the Observer concludes that Bob is likely to recidivate if Alice has 
a criminal history because other people with parents like Alice have also 
gone on to recidivate. 
Similar inferences might follow if Alice and Bob share a household. 
Recent attempts to predict opioid abuse, for example, operate by assigning 
risk scores to patients, and then making those scores available to insurers 
and hospitals to be used in prescription decisions. A higher risk score may 
be assigned to people whose fellow household members have a history of 
abuse, even if there is no documented misuse.94 An Observer predicts that 
 
91. Joe Pinsker, People Who Use Firefox or Chrome Are Better Employees, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/people-who-use-firefox-or-chrome-
are-better-employees/387781/ [https://perma.cc/R7H5-JLBR]. 
92. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/7UUX-GZGX]. 
93. Sample COMPAS Risk Assessment, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2702103-
Sample-Risk-Assessment-COMPAS-CORE.html [https://perma.cc/6G3F-BC6S] (specifically 
questions 33, 34, 37, and 38). 
94. Mohana Ravindranath, How Your Health Information is Sold and Turned Into ‘Risk Scores,’ 
POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/03/health-risk-scores-opioid-
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Bob is more likely to abuse opioids because it knows that Alice has abused 
opioids, that Alice lives in the same place as Bob, and that people tend to 
abuse opioids at a higher rate if they live with other abusers. At first blush, 
this approach seems to have more in common with the tie-based 
dependencies that allow an Observer to discover certain things about Bob 
because it is keeping track of Alice: knowing that Alice has an opioid 
prescription and that Alice lives with Bob means that an Observer also 
knows that Bob has easy access to Alice’s medicine. Yet this observation 
alone might not help predict Bob’s risk of abuse, unless the Observer has 
found that other people in similar circumstances as Bob—for instance, 
those with easy access to others’ drugs—have been more likely to 
abuse  opioids. 
Information about people’s broader social networks can also serve as 
the basis for inferences about undisclosed or unobserved characteristics.95 
The ability to infer things about people based on their connections to 
others in a social network first drew significant attention among privacy 
scholars when researchers demonstrated that sexual orientation could be 
predicted from one’s friends’ disclosures of sexual orientation.96 In other 
words, even if Bob withholds information about his own sexual 
orientation, his explicit connection to people who have disclosed may 
improve an Observer’s ability to accurately infer that of Bob.97 In addition 
to sexual orientation, previous research has shown that information from 
Bob’s friends can accurately predict characteristics like religion, location, 
and who Bob’s other friends are—even in the absence of Bob providing 
such information himself.98 In fact, even information about Bob’s friends 
 
abuse-1139978 [https://perma.cc/E63S-HPUR] (noting that risk scores for opioid addiction and 
overdose take into account “information about a patient’s friends, family, and roommates”); see also 
Mathijs de Vaan et al., Diffusion of Opioids Within the Family Household (2018) (working paper) (on 
file with authors). 
95. See MacCarthy, supra note 20, at 452–53. See generally Alan Mislove et al., You Are Who You 
Know: Inferring User Profiles in Online Social Networks, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ACM 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WEB SEARCH AND DATA MINING 251 (2010). 
96. Carter Jernigan & Behram F.T. Mistree, Gaydar: Facebook Friendships Expose Sexual 
Orientation, 14 FIRST MONDAY (2009), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2611/
2302 [https://perma.cc/68NA-SE8J]. 
97. In fact, researchers have found that a good deal of private information (including sexual 
orientation) can be inferred about nonusers from data given over by users. See David Garcia, Leaking 
Privacy and Shadow Profiles in Online Social Networks, 3 SCI. ADVANCES (Aug. 4, 2017), 
http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/3/8/e1701172.full [https://perma.cc/GHK6-MYMW]. 
98. David Garcia, Privacy Beyond the Individual, 3 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 112, 112 (2019). 
Moreover, even in cases in which Bob does provide some information himself, the predictive power 
of his friends’ data can be even greater than his own. See id. (“the data produced by our online friends 
can be a better predictor of our future behavior than our own data” (emphasis added)); James P. 
Bagrow et al., Information Flow Reveals Prediction Limits in Online Social Activity, 3 NATURE HUM. 
BEHAV. 122, 124–25 (2019) (when predicting the words a person was likely to use in a future social 
media post, the person’s friends’ posts were more informative than the person’s own past posts). 
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of friends (that is, people two hops away from Bob in the network) can be 
the basis for strong prediction of Bob’s own attributes.99 
Recent attempts to leverage social network data in credit scoring rely 
on inferences like these.100 These inferences operate in two rather different 
ways. First, the Observer might believe that social networks exhibit 
homophily (“love of sameness”) as to a particular quality—
creditworthiness—and that people in a network are thus likely to be 
similar to one another in that respect, allowing the Observer to impute 
what it knows about Bob’s associates to Bob himself.101 Or, the Observer 
might have learned that other people with a similar group of friends as 
Bob tend to default on their loans, even if Bob’s friends do not. In this 
case, the inference depends on Bob’s similarity to other people with such 
friends, not on the similarity between Bob and Bob’s friends. Note that 
both cases involve drawing inferences from past observations. In the first 
case, the concept of homophily that allows the Observer to judge Bob on 
the basis of his friends grows out of prior observations of social networks 
exhibiting homophily. In the second case, the Observer may penalize Bob 
because other people with a similar set of friends as Bob have tended to 
default in the past. 
We may be especially concerned about drawing negative inferences 
about Bob based on his social ties when those ties are non-volitional: for 
example, Bob did not choose his parents. It may strike us as deeply unfair 
to punish Bob for relationships completely outside his control, rather than 
for his own conduct.102 But we may still object, in some cases, when we 
make inferences about Bob based on associates over which he has more 
control—his friends, for example—based on a concern about chilling his 
association with potentially “hazardous” Alices. In aggregate, the effect 
of many Bobs defensively curating their social networks to avoid negative 
inferences might deepen social stratification, impede socioeconomic 
mobility, and contribute to polarization, both on- and offline.103 
 
99. Some social networks exhibit monophily (or “love of one”)—that is, people may have extreme 
preferences for others with a particular trait that is not necessarily their own (for example, a woman 
with friends who are mostly men). Kristen M. Altenburger & Johan Ugander, Monophily in Social 
Networks Introduces Similarity Among Friends-of-Friends, 2 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 284, 284 
(2018). Recent research demonstrates that in networks with this property, Bob’s attributes can be 
strongly predicted by comparing him to friends of friends. Id. at 284. Altenburger and Ugander’s 
study demonstrates that “friends-of-friends (‘the company you’re kept in’) can disclose private 
attribute information that is otherwise undisclosed by friends (‘the company you keep’).” Id. at 284. 
100. See generally Yanhao Wei et al., Credit Scoring with Social Network Data, 35 MARKETING 
SCI. 234 (2015). 
101. EASLEY & KLEINBERG, supra note 29, at 77–79.  
102. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 24:16 (New International Version) (“Parents are not to be put to death 
for their children, nor children put to death for their parents; each will die for their own sin.”). 
103. Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, On Social Credit and the Right to Be 
Unnetworked, 2 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 392–99 (2016) (“[R]ational users aware of potential 
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2. Socially Salient Group 
As we have argued elsewhere, similar inferences can be drawn about 
people even without knowledge of their explicit ties to others.104 
Characteristics like gender, race, and age, for example, function as the 
basis for a whole range of routine inferences, both trivial and profound, 
even when the people who share these characteristics do not share any 
direct social connection. Thus, Alice and Bob may be strangers to one 
another, but their similar age might lead an Observer to believe that Bob 
shares many of Alice’s other observed traits. 
Such inferences can be so mundane as to seem unworthy of discussion, 
but consider their practical import: businesses have long relied on broad 
demographic categories to differentiate among customers, trusting that 
such categories reliably predict consumer preferences and behavior, given 
past observations of people with these characteristics.105 Knowing only 
someone’s gender, race, or age allows marketers to bring to bear an 
enormous amount of prior observations about the tendencies of people in 
these demographic groups. Coveted markets like “men aged 18–24” are a 
cultural cliché, but the cliché reveals the extent to which we are always 
understood in terms of those like us.106 
Characteristics like these frequently figure into our everyday inferences 
because they are highly visible and allow us to quickly bring to bear all 
that we associate with people with these characteristics. This also gives 
these characteristics a unique social salience—a deeply felt sense that 
these are among the most important qualities that define us and that allow 
us to identify with others like us. 
When and why we are likely to view characteristics as socially salient 
characteristics matters for the perceived legitimacy of the resulting 
inferences. A person might feel social affinity with others on the basis of 
a wide range of characteristics, ranging from gender to neighborhood or 
 
financial harm from certain online interactions may seek to remove hazardous links while 
strengthening beneficial social ties. They may sanitize their list of friends by unfriending those who 
went bankrupt, lost their jobs, live in a poor neighborhood, or are otherwise perceived as financially 
risky, and by permitting their social network friends to include only those with good careers and 
financial standing.”). 
104. See, e.g., Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 86, at 62 (explaining that inferences can be 
drawn about people based on their resemblance to others “with whom they have no meaningful or 
recognized relations.”). 
105. See generally JOSEPH TUROW, BREAKING UP AMERICA: ADVERTISERS AND THE NEW MEDIA 
WORLD (1997). 
106. Of course, decision-makers could also rely on a lack of common characteristics, where your 
dissimilarity from a group about which much is known means that you’re assumed not to possess one 
of the qualities that defines the group. For example, employers might think that certain job applicants 
could not be qualified because they do not fit the stereotype for the particular role. 
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occupation, but also seemingly more trivial things like one’s food 
preferences.107 All of these might be socially salient in the sense that 
people understand their connections to others in these terms and recognize 
that these shared traits might imply a broader set of common beliefs and 
experiences. And yet there are morally relevant differences in how certain 
characteristics come to be perceived as socially salient. In some cases, 
certain characteristics might emerge organically as those that feel like an 
especially relevant point of both social differentiation (“we are a unique 
group!”) and social solidarity (“we share so much in common!”). In other 
cases, certain characteristics might have deep social salience because they 
have served as the basis for imposing the social differentiation necessary 
for establishing and maintaining social hierarchies. The social 
significance of a characteristic like race flows in part from the fact that it 
has served—and continues to serve—as an explicit basis 
for subjugation.108 
In recognition of this history, the law forbids inferences on the basis of 
certain socially salient characteristics in the kinds of high-stakes decisions 
that shape people’s life chances and life course. In particular, 
discrimination law enumerates a set of characteristics that must not figure 
into decisions in such areas as employment,109 credit,110 and housing.111 
While philosophers and legal scholars have advanced competing 
normative theories to account for the wrongfulness of discrimination, the 
law seems to have singled out these characteristics for special treatment 
because these characteristics have served as the basis for unjust 
deprivations in the past.112 Under certain theories, discrimination leads to 
an unjust deprivation when a decision is driven by a decision-maker’s 
animus or prejudice.113 Other theories view discrimination’s wrongfulness 
in terms of its coarse groupings and crass stereotypes—inferences that 
lack sufficient accuracy or precision, thus depriving the deserving of 
 
107. See Kim Severson, What’s for Dinner? The Pollster Wants to Know, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/16/dining/16voters.html [https://perma.cc/636A-VMYU]. 
108. See Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, The Badness of Discrimination, 9 ETHICAL THEORY & 
MORAL PRAC. 167, 169 (2006). In the United States, for much of the twentieth century, overt 
discrimination on the basis of race was commonplace, depriving people of basic rights, and limiting 
their ability to seek employment, housing, or credit. Public expressions of racial animus were routine; 
demeaning race-based stereotypes were pervasive. Everyday life was shot through with racism. See 
generally DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE 
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). 
109. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2018). 
110. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f (2018). 
111. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619. 
112. Andrew Altman, Discrimination, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward 
N. Zalta ed., 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/AB8B-LJ98]. 
113. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985). 
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important opportunities114 and needlessly condemning entire social 
groups to categorical judgment.115 Still others trace the injustice of 
discrimination back to the lesser moral status that it seems to accord 
specific social groups, as if these socially salient characteristics justify 
showing certain people less respect.116 The law formalizes these various 
intuitions by prohibiting certain decision-makers from viewing people as 
relevantly similar on the basis of these protected characteristics. 
Notably, discrimination law prohibits decision-makers from 
considering these characteristics even when they demonstrate predictive 
value.117 Drawing accurate inferences on the basis of membership in a 
protected class does not make such inferences lawful. Rather, 
discrimination law forbids decision-makers from falling back on, for 
example, race- or gender-based heuristics, even when doing so may serve 
a seemingly rational goal.118 Instead, the law forces decision-makers to 
identify other points of similarity among those who hold the sought-after 
quality.119 This reflects a belief that people should never be judged merely 
or even partially on their membership in a protected class because these 
categories lack moral relevance when assessing someone for a job, a loan, 
or an apartment. In other words, discrimination law views the potential 
statistical relevance of protected characteristics as itself morally suspect—
as a statistical artifact of some past injustice that cannot justify subjecting 
people to further disadvantage. 
While we might resist all sorts of generalizations, profiles, or 
stereotypes, the law only forbids those that involve socially salient 
characteristics that are essential to people’s self-definition and have 
served as the basis for systematic oppression in the past. 
3. Non-Socially-Salient Group 
Finally, statistical analysis may also reveal that certain qualities tend to 
correlate with characteristics that we might not think of as socially 
meaningful. Rather than using recognizable demographic categories (like 
gender, race, or age) to target marketing to a group, advertisers might use 
behavioral data, like what websites users tend to visit, as the basis for 
targeting. As Brian d’Alessandro explains, “[t]raditionally, demographic 
 
114. See generally ALAN GOLDMAN, JUSTICE AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (2015). 
115. Schauer, supra note 82, at 22–24. 
116. See generally DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 35–37 (2008). 
117. See Michelle R. Gomez, The Next Generation of Disparate Treatment: A Merger of Law and 
Social Science, 32 REV. LITIG. 553, 562 (2013). 
118. Id.  
119. See id. at 562–63 n.32.  
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and lifestyle data has served as a proxy for a good audience. With modern 
server logs holding behavioral data that tracks every last click, marketing 
firms can do away with the proxies and build audience segments with a 
high likelihood to take some sort of specific action.”120 Such innovations 
mean that we cannot take for granted that the features that define a group 
will correspond with the existing broad categories of social identity, 
including the categories protected by discrimination law. These inferences 
do not rely on an articulable social identity to get at some quality that is 
difficult to observe directly; rather, they identify entirely new ways to 
recognize relevant points of similarity. But these are not social groups in 
any meaningful sense.121 They do not share any basis for social kinship 
because the group definition is entirely decoupled from those personal 
attributes and activities through which we experience identity. 
Facebook offers advertisers a targeting mechanism that makes this shift 
clear. Traditionally, advertisers might have come to Facebook with a pre-
established market in mind (e.g., men aged eighteen to twenty-four), 
which they would target using Facebook’s demographic-based tools. In 
contrast, advertisers can now also ask the social network to find so-called 
“lookalike audiences”122—other users on the social network who 
resemble those who have previously exhibited an interest in the advertised 
product or service. Facebook does this by first finding points of similarity 
among those who have interacted with the advertiser in the past and then 
looks for other users who share these same points of similarity.123 
Notably, Facebook is able to consider an enormous range of possible 
points of similarity because the social network has such detailed and wide-
ranging information about people, their interests, their associations, and 
their behaviors. As a result, the relevant points of similarity identified by 
Facebook might involve a mix of characteristics that, if revealed, would 
not be terribly meaningful to humans. 
Even when such groupings demonstrate statistical validity—that is, 
even when the computationally generated “lookalike audiences” end up 
exhibiting significantly more interest in the advertised products or 
services than other users—the characteristics that underlie these groups 
may feel rather arbitrary. As a consequence, the decision to treat people 
that belong to this group differently than others can feel equally arbitrary, 
no matter how accurately group membership predicts a specific outcome 
of interest. If the characteristics that decision-makers view as relevant do 
 
120. Brian d’Alessandro, Actions Predict Louder Than Words, O’REILLY RADAR (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://radar.oreilly.com/2013/10/actions-predict-louder-than-words.html [https://perma.cc/QW69-4LG5].  
121. Vedder, supra note 17, at 278. 
122. Ad Targeting, FACEBOOK BUS., https://www.facebook.com/business/a/lookalike-audiences 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2020).  
123. Create a Lookalike Audience, FACEBOOK BUS., https://www.facebook.com/business/help/ 
465262276878947?id=401668390442328 (last visited May 9, 2010). 
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not map onto socially salient differences in the world, the decision-
making that relies on this differentiation may lack perceived legitimacy.124 
For example, even though our cultural tastes—in literature, music, film, 
and cuisine, among other things—often serve as the basis for inferences 
about our intelligence, we are unlikely to recognize our interest in “Curly 
Fries” as a reasonable basis for concluding that we must have a high IQ, 
despite empirical research establishing this correlation.125 Rather than 
objecting to the treatment of a specific group, we might object to the idea 
that this is even a meaningful group in the first place. 
The novel computational techniques like machine learning that allow 
us to identify these new points of relevant similarity raise one of the most 
basic questions about discrimination law and other frameworks for 
assessing the fairness of decision-making: what groups are sufficiently 
vulnerable that they warrant special protection? Even though “[t]he 
concept of discrimination itself places no substantive restrictions on 
which salient social groups could, in principle, count for purposes of 
determining whether an act is an act of discrimination,”126 new 
computational methods are deeply troubling because they confound 
attempts to even arrive at definitions of social groups that hold any 
resonance.127 The set of characteristics that discrimination law recognizes 
as an illegitimate basis for decision-making are those that have served as 
the basis for subjugation and unjust treatment in the past. The salience of 
characteristics like gender, race, age, religion, marital status, sexual 
orientation, and national origin, among others recognized in law, stems 
from the fact that decision-makers and institutions have previously and 
explicitly relied on these characteristics to justify their adverse actions. In 
contrast, we are unlikely to view blue shoe-wearing people as a group 
entitled to special legal protection under discrimination law, even if 
critical decisions rest on inferences drawn on that basis. The seemingly 
random characteristics that support today’s machine learning-driven 
 
124. Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1096–98 (2018). 
125. See Michal Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes are Predictable from Digital Records 
of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5802, 5804 (2013) (finding that one of the 
Facebook Likes predicting high IQ is “Curly Fries”).  
126. Altman, supra note 112. 
127. Zarsky raised exactly such objections to an early settlement with DoubleClick that required 
the company to grant data subjects access to the categories into which they had been slotted, arguing 
that “the clusters formed are not required to conform to the taxonomy used to divide the population 
in the past, or answer to catchy names such as ‘Pools and Patios’ or ‘Shotguns and Pickups.’ The 
borders of such classes might be elaborate, not easily defined by a simple category name, and ever-
changing.” Tal Zarsky, Cookie Viewers and the Undermining of Data-Mining: A Critical Review of 
the DoubleClick Settlement, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002). 
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inferences may lack the necessary social history to elevate them to the 
status of legally protected characteristics.128 
Of course, decisions rendered on the basis of characteristics that lack 
social salience may still result in disparities along socially salient lines. In 
many cases, newly identified groups might map closely to traditional 
social groups because many of the relevant points of similarity will be 
correlated with protected characteristics. Thus, even when the basis for 
decision-making lacks the necessary social salience and legal status to 
bring a charge of disparate treatment, we may be able to observe and 
contest any resulting disparate impact because we can map these 
inequalities in outcome back to socially salient and legally protected 
characteristics.129 
But in other cases, there will be no apparent mapping between a set of 
non-socially-salient factors and traditional social groups, taking us out of 
the familiar realm of discrimination law. In those cases, people subject to 
adverse decisions have no socially salient criteria from which to make 
sense of and contest their treatment.130 As Jonathan Simon concludes, “the 
effect of actuarial practices is precisely to make it more difficult for 
groups to intensify their solidarity or to exercise political choice.”131 
When inferences are drawn on the basis of broad demographic categories, 
groups defined by these categories might be able to mobilize on that basis 
to resist adverse treatment. Responding to these new groupings, in 
contrast, requires solidarity in the absence of meaningful social ties.132 
 
 
128. Zarsky suggests a novel approach to this issue: to the extent that predictive analytics premise 
different treatment on attributes other than those that characterize existing salient social groups—say, 
shopping habits or dietary preferences—and which people consider central to their self-definition, we 
might explicitly add such elements as protected categories in antidiscrimination law. Tal Z. Zarsky, 
An Analytic Challenge: Discrimination Theory in the Age of Predictive Analytics, 14 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y 
INFO. SOC’Y 11, 32–34 (2017). 
129. See, e.g., Muhammad Ali et al., Discrimination Through Optimization: How Facebook’s Ad 
Delivery Can Lead to Skewed Outcomes, ARXIV (Apr. 19, 2019), https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.02095 
[https://perma.cc/SAB5-7UHG]. 
130. As de Vries points out, the demise of identity politics has its costs: “awareness of gender biases in 
language . . . allows me to challenge this structure, for example, by structurally using ‘she’ and not ‘he’ as 
a generic pronoun, or inventing new combinations: s/he. In contrast, in our present post-computational turn 
era it could easily happen that I’m subjected to profiles, categories and semiotic structures (‘suspect type’, 
‘profitable customer,’ etc.) of which I am not aware. This lack of knowledge and transparency . . . makes 
it very difficult to challenge or critique those structures with the tools of the linguistic turn of the 1970s.” 
Katja de Vries, Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn: A Parable and a First Analysis, in 
PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN: THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW MEETS THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 9, 24 (2013). 
131. Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 771, 787 (1988). 
132. Virginia Eubanks notes that digital social sorting prevents the creation of solidarity across 
race, gender, and class lines, in contrast to physical segregation and containment of people with 
particular characteristics, which had “the unintentional result” of fomenting such solidarity. VIRGINIA 
EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE 
POOR 184 (2018). 
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* * * 
While the similarity-based dependencies that we have described above 
all involve the same practical mechanism—recognizing when a person 
shares the same observable characteristics as those with a sought-after 
trait and inferring that the person is likely to possess the trait as well—
they differ in what they identify as the relevant points of similarity. Being 
judged on the basis of the company you keep, your membership in a 
legally protected class, or your seemingly arbitrary grouping with others 
each raises different concerns. We recoil at the idea of judging a child on 
the basis of their parents’ misdeeds; we reject the notion that employers, 
lenders, and landlords should be free to discriminate against a person 
according to their gender; and we fail to recognize our solidarity with 
others subject to the same treatment. 
As a general matter, though, we might argue that people should be 
judged for what they do, not for the behaviors of those with whom they 
share certain characteristics. Similarity-based dependencies violate the 
moral intuition that people deserve to be treated as individuals and subject 
to individualized judgment. They also deny people the opportunity to 
abstain from disclosing details that seemingly similar people have 
willingly divulged. And yet there is no way to avoid using generalizations 
or avoid being subject to them.133 As we’ve pointed out, “[i]nsurance 
offers the most obvious example of this: the rate that a person pays for car 
insurance, for instance, is determined by the way other people with similar 
characteristics happen to drive, even if the person is a better driver than 
those who resemble him on the statistically pertinent dimensions.”134 One 
might retort that the insurer could do more to distinguish the person from 
these drivers, finding additional characteristics that demonstrate that he is 
a safer driver than most in the group. Yet even this maneuver rests on 
identifying the ways in which the person is similar to other—safer—
drivers; it just does so on a larger number of dimensions. Once the insurer 
has learned so much about the person that he ceases to resemble anyone 
that the insurer has seen before, the insurer will not be able to improve the 
precision of its predictions any further. In this sense, the insurer is simply 
unable to judge the person as an individual. Any inference about his likely 
driving must rest on comparisons to others. 
Similarity-based dependencies are worrisome when they subject 
people to coarse generalizations, but they can be equally worrisome when 
they allow for overly granular distinctions. Once again, insurance nicely 
illustrates this point. For some, the prospect of being lumped in with 
 
133. Schauer, supra note 82, at 67. 
134. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 
688–89 n.67 (2016). 
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others who are far less healthy may provoke outrage: insurance premiums 
should reflect differences in people’s underlying health risks. For others, 
the very purpose of insurance is to spread the costs of these risks across 
policyholders: those in good health should cross-subsidize those in poor 
health. Some healthcare laws forbid insurers from pursuing too much 
granularity in pricing premiums.135 Community rating pricing schemes, 
for example, require that all people in a given area receive the same 
price—regardless of health status or other risk factors.136 The goal of this 
restriction is to ensure that communities effectively socialize within-
community differences in healthcare costs by offering everyone similar 
premiums, even if insurers could figure out which individuals within the 
community will prove more or less costly.137 Doing so prevents insurers 
from charging high premiums to unhealthy people or denying them 
coverage altogether.138 
C. Difference 
A third sort of dependency involves difference between Alice and Bob. 
In these cases, by revealing some information about herself to the 
Observer, Alice allows the Observer to learn something about Bob by 
making herself distinguishable from Bob. Importantly, Alice need have 
no connection to, knowledge of, nor similarity to Bob for this to occur—
yet Bob’s privacy still depends upon Alice’s behavior, because it allows 
the Observer to deduce something about Bob. 
Here, we describe three subtypes of this dependency. In process of 
elimination, Alice and Bob are members of a set of people suspected of 
some proscribed behavior; when Alice tenders information about herself, 
the Observer can winnow down the set to identify Bob. In anomaly 
detection, the Observer already has information from all parties—but only 
by comparing Bob’s data to that of more “normal” Alices is the Observer 
able to make meaning from its atypicality. Finally, adverse inference 
occurs when Bob chooses to withhold some bit of information, but most 
Alices disclose—turning Bob’s nondisclosure into a signal that effectively 
communicates the underlying information to the Observer. 
 
135. Anthony T. Lo Sasso & Ithai Z. Lurie, Community Rating and the Market for Private Non-
Group Health Insurance, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 264, 266 (2009). 
136. Id. 
137. The Affordable Care Act has an adjusted community rating requirement, meaning that 
insurers are actually allowed to vary individual premiums based on certain factors like age and 
tobacco use, but not others like previous medical claims. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(1) (2018). 
138. Santosh Rao, Q&A: Community Rating & Adjusted Community Rating Under the ACA, AM. 
HEALTH LINE, https://www.americanhealthline.com/analysis-and-insight/question-and-answer/q-
and-a-community-rating [https://perma.cc/KB64-S8WV]. 
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1. Process of Elimination 
In some cases, Alice may be motivated to provide information about 
herself for exculpatory purposes, which by implication can teach the 
Observer something about Bob. Assume, for instance, that law 
enforcement knows that someone using a network in a university dorm 
made a bomb threat to disrupt a final exam. Assume further that only two 
people were using that dorm’s network at the time of the threat: Alice and 
Bob. Having narrowed the set of likely suspects to these users, the police 
approach Alice and interrogate her about her activities at the time the 
threats were transmitted; Alice, being genuinely innocent and motivated 
to establish as much to the police, shares with the police a convincing 
alibi.139 
Alice’s rendering of this information—purely about herself—gives the 
police information about Bob by implication: specifically, that Bob, as the 
only other member of the suspect set, is very likely the perpetrator of the 
bomb threat.140 In the real world, law enforcement might have access to 
such a suspect set in the context of “crime-out” investigations, in which 
police obtain data (like IP addresses, cell phone records, or surveillance 
camera footage) about all individuals in the vicinity of a crime—often 
through “reverse search warrants” served on telecoms and other 
companies, which may provide data on hundreds of devices.141 They then 
systematically rule out suspects from this set to identify the perpetrator. 
As Jane Bambauer notes, “This sort of [third-party] information could 
give the police an initial suspect pool that could then be winnowed further 
with the usual detective work.”142 
In this context, Bob’s privacy depends on uncertainty, and it is only 
possible to maintain the uncertainty upon which Bob’s privacy depends if 
 
139. This hypothetical scenario draws from a real example. In 2013, a Harvard student made such 
a threat. FBI agents were able to identify the student because, though the student had used Tor and an 
anonymous email program to send the threat, he did so using Harvard’s wireless network. Though 
agents could not tell from network logs precisely what the student was doing using Tor, they could 
tell that he was one of a small set of students using Tor at the time of the threat, which led to his 
detection. PJ Vogt, That Bomb-Hoaxing Harvard Student Was Using Tor, But They Caught Him 
Anyway, WNYC (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.wnyc.org/story/harvard-bomb-threat/ 
[https://perma.cc/9YE4-E4JU]. 
140. MacCarthy describes another instance of this dependency in the hypothetical: “Suppose from 
public data records, it can be inferred that one of two people was involved in a particular transaction 
and that the person who engaged in the particular transaction was right-handed. If one of the two 
people discloses that he is left-handed, he or she thereby discloses that the other person engaged in 
the transaction.” MacCarthy, supra note 20, at 446. 
141. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Tracking Phones, Google is a Dragnet for the Police, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/13/us/google-location-
tracking-police.html (calling these “geofence warrants”). 
142. Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94 TEX. L. REV. 205, 234 (2015). 
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certain details about others remain unknown. It may seem unintuitive to 
think of Bob’s interest here as a privacy interest; after all, criminal 
investigations often require winnowing a suspect pool in this way. But we 
can just as easily imagine Bob being identified as a political dissident, or 
whistleblower, or as a person accessing state-censored content, through 
process of elimination. The point is that the mechanism of learning a 
secret about Bob relies on the disclosure of Alice and the subsequent 
deductive reasoning that her disclosure allows. 
This situation has three necessary prerequisites.143 First, Alice and Bob 
must belong to a closed set of potential targets.144 Second, the Observer 
must be able to uniquely distinguish all members of the set, including Bob, 
relative to one another.145 And finally, the Observer must be able to learn 
exculpatory information about all Alices (that is, all members of the set 
except Bob) in order to deduce that Bob is the culprit146 Pragmatically, 
this implies that the set of potential targets is of relatively small size to 
make such evidence-gathering manageable. 
Efforts to protect privacy through anonymity generally take one of 
three approaches to attenuate the conditions required for the Observer to 
identify Bob—each oriented toward falsifying one of these prerequisites. 
The first prerequisite—that the suspect set is closed—may be falsified by 
creating uncertainty about the size of the suspect set. Doing so disrupts 
the ability of the Observer to bound the number of possible suspects, such 
that even exculpating everyone except Bob does not conclusively 
implicate him. In the board game Clue, for example, players compete by 
deducing, via process of elimination, which of six dinner guests at a 
mysterious estate committed a murder; in every instance of gameplay, the 
murder was committed by one of these six. But a key twist in the 1985 
film adaptation of the board game is that one murder was committed by a 
character outside the suspect set—Mr. Boddy, the owner of the estate, 
who has been masquerading as the house’s butler.147 The source of 
surprise for the film’s audience is the falsification of the first prerequisite: 
that only members of the set might be the person of interest. Even reverse 
search warrants premised on cell phone data are imperfect in this regard: 
they may not capture data about all phones in an area, not to mention 
potential suspects without cell phones.148 
 




147. CLUE (Paramount Pictures 1985). 
148. Valentino-DeVries, supra note 141, (noting that even Google’s vast Sensorvault, used to 
provide geofenced cell phone data to the police, doesn’t capture every phone); see also Jennifer 
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These strategies respond to the fact that even when, for example, 
activity on a network is anonymized, the use of that network can often be 
more readily identified (as in the university bomb threat), giving the 
Observer a finite number of possible suspects to consider.149 Certain 
anonymity-preserving tools therefore aim to facilitate fully unobservable 
communication such that, to the Observer, the user appears to be making 
“regular [non-proscribed] network connections, while the user is actually 
getting connected to destinations that are forbidden by that monitoring 
entity.”150 In other words, the monitor cannot detect who is using an 
anonymized network (and is therefore in the suspect set) in the first place, 
and who is not. 
Another approach is to falsify the second prerequisite by making set 
members incapable of being uniquely identified relative to one another. 
This is accomplished by creating plausible deniability for set members: 
that is, making set members sufficiently indistinguishable from one 
another such that no Observer could conclusively determine which one of 
them committed an observed act, transmitted particular information, or 
holds a particular identity. One method of doing so involves making 
everyone in the suspect set look identical. For example, in the “I am 
Spartacus” technique discussed by Brunton and Nissenbaum,151 multiple 
members of the set claim the same identity to thwart distinguishability. 
Alternatively, set members are not made to look identical, but their data 
are “mixed up” such that it is hard to associate any behavior with a unique 
 
Lynch, Google’s Sensorvault Can Tell Police Where You’ve Been, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/googles-sensorvault-can-tell-police-where-
youve-been [https://perma.cc/Q5YP-S678] (“[T]here’s a high probability the true perpetrator isn’t 
even included in the data disclosed by Google. For these kinds of warrants, officers are just operating 
off a hunch that the unknown suspect had a cellphone that generated location data collected by 
Google. This shouldn’t be enough to support probable cause, because it’s just as likely that the suspect 
wasn’t carrying an Android phone or using Google apps at the time.”). 
149. See Vogt, supra note 139. 
150. Amir Houmansadr et al., Cirripede: Circumvention Infrastructure Using Router Redirection 
with Plausible Deniability, PROC. 18TH ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 187, 188 
(2011). A recent Google policy change makes this more difficult by blocking “domain-fronting,” a 
practice in which developers used Google as a proxy to avoid state censorship: “[a]s long as the 
service was using domain-fronting, all the in-country data requests would appear as if they were 
headed for Google.com, with encryption preventing censors from digging any deeper.” Russell 
Brandom, A Google Update Just Created a Big Problem for Anti-Censorship Tools, VERGE (Apr. 18, 
2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/18/17253784/google-domain-fronting-discontinued-
signal-tor-vpn [https://perma.cc/SLV4-PW85]. 
151. The example derives from the scene in the film Spartacus in which “the rebel slaves are asked 
by Roman soldiers to identify their leader, whom the soldiers intend to crucify. As Spartacus . . . is 
about to speak, one by one the others around him say ‘I am Spartacus!’ until the entire crowd is 
claiming that identity.” FINN BRUNTON & HELEN NISSENBAUM, OBFUSCATION: A USER’S GUIDE FOR 
PRIVACY AND PROTEST 15 (2015); see also Zbigniew Kwecka et al., “I am Spartacus”: Privacy 
Enhancing Technologies, Collaborative Obfuscation and Privacy as a Public Good, 22 ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE & L. 113, 115–16 (2014).  
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identity. Obfuscation techniques like swapping loyalty cards to create 
noise in data about shopping patterns decrease the degree to which 
observations tied to a particular identifier can be tied to a unique 
individual.152 Similarly, someone setting up a Tor exit node maintains 
plausible deniability as to the transmission of illegal content through the 
network, as Tor routes many individuals’ traffic through multiple servers, 
making the transmission of any particular piece of information 
unattributable to a specific person.153 
A final strategy is to falsify the third prerequisite pragmatically, by 
expanding the size of the suspect set to create “strength in numbers.”154 
Anonymity-preserving networks are more effective at masking individual 
behavior when they have many users, making identification of a particular 
user more practically difficult. The effectiveness of this strategy depends 
in part on the resources that the Observer brings to bear on the task of 
identifying Bob. As Paul Syverson, one of Tor’s creators, noted, having 
only “a few hundred concurrent users” on an anonymity network “is fine 
if the goal is simply plausible deniability”—but inadequate for protection 
against law enforcement or state intelligence, because “[i]f the adversary 
has the incentives and resources of a nation-state or of organized 
crime . . . the small anonymity set means that it is now within the resource 
constraints of the adversary to closely scrutinize the online and offline 
behavior of everyone identified as participating.”155 However, the size of 
the set considered “manageable” to sift through has expanded 
significantly thanks to automated analytic tools available to law 
enforcement.156 
One additional point is worth noting. Even when conclusive 
identification of Bob is impossible—say, because the Observer cannot 
obtain exculpatory information about each Alice, such that it cannot 
winnow down the set of suspects to a single member—Bob can 
nonetheless suffer a privacy harm. Say that the Observer knows initially 
that one member of a set of ten committed a crime. Knowing nothing 
 
152. BRUNTON & NISSENBAUM, supra note 151, at 28–29. 
153. See Tor Project: Overview, TOR, https://2019.www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en 
[https://perma.cc/RH28-M8V7]. 
154. Cooper Quintin, Tor is for Everyone: Why You Should Use Tor, GIZMODO (Jun. 15, 2014), 
https://gizmodo.com/tor-is-for-everyone-why-you-should-use-tor-1591191905 
[https://perma.cc/UJL3-M68X]. 
155. Paul Syverson, Practical Vulnerabilities of the Tor Anonymity Network, in ADVANCES IN 
CYBER SECURITY: TECHNOLOGY, OPERATION, AND EXPERIENCES 60, 65 (D. Frank Hsu & Dorothy 
Marinucci eds., 2013). 
156. Bambauer, supra note 142, at 210 (“Without computers, even the most legitimate searches 
conducted with a warrant based on probable cause required police to tromp through houses, flip 
through diaries, and sift through large amounts of personal information unrelated to the investigation. 
Automated searches, by contrast, can tailor information access so that most irrelevant data is filtered 
out.”). 
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except the membership of the group, the Observer knows that Bob’s 
likelihood of being the culprit is 10%. But as the Observer rules out Alices 
from the denominator, Bob’s likelihood of being the person within the set 
who committed the crime increases. Inference need not be definitive to 
infringe upon privacy.157 Even if the Observer never identifies Bob, it may 
deduce that Bob has a high likelihood of having committed the crime, 
implicating Bob’s privacy and potentially leading to him being 
treated  differently.158 
The use of process-of-elimination techniques can be controversial, 
especially in law enforcement, because it requires engaging in the sort of 
broad, unlimited “fishing expedition” that the Fourth Amendment is 
specifically intended to proscribe. While no court rulings have yet 
considered the validity of reverse search warrants, privacy advocates and 
defense attorneys have begun to challenge their constitutionality.159 
What’s more, the existence of process-of-elimination dependencies in 
investigative contexts reveals a more general and fundamental truth about 
the relational nature of anonymity. Anonymity is not a characteristic of an 
individual, nor a result of individual actions that people take to make 
themselves unidentifiable. Rather, only by preventing an Observer from 
distinguishing Alice from Bob can Bob maintain some degree of 
anonymity. What distinguishes us from others is what identifies us. 
Anonymity, then, depends not only on what is known or unknown about 
you—but also what is known or unknown about others. Anonymity 
depends, therefore, on the actions of a collective; it cannot be 
achieved  alone. 
The relational nature of anonymity has real consequences for policies 
intended to protect us from being identified within a group. Laws and 
policies commonly require that datasets be stripped of personally 
 
157. Cf. MacCarthy, supra note 20, at 455 (noting probabilistic nature of information externalities 
in data mining). 
158. Arvind Narayanan, Joanna Huey, and Ed Felten articulate this principle in the closely related 
context of dataset re-identification:  
Suppose an analyst can narrow down the possibilities for Alice’s record in a de-identified 
medical database to one of ten records. If all ten records show a diagnosis of liver cancer, the 
analyst learns that Alice has liver cancer. If nine of the ten show liver cancer, then the analyst 
can infer that there is a high likelihood of Alice having liver cancer. Either way, Alice’s privacy 
has been impacted, even though no individual database record could be associated with her. 
Arvind Narayanan et al., A Precautionary Approach to Big Data Privacy, in DATA PROTECTION ON 
THE MOVE 357, 360 (2016); see also supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing inference 
based on aggregate statistics). 
159. See, e.g., Defendant Okello Chatrie’s Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained from a 
“Geofence” General Warrant at 1, United States v. Chatrie, No. 3:19-CR-00130-MHL (E.D. Va. Oct. 
29, 2019) (moving to suppress evidence of geofence warrant used to obtain cell phone information 
from all nineteen people in the vicinity of a bank robbery, on grounds of overbreadth and lack of 
particularity); Lynch, supra note 148. 
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identifiable information (PII). Various laws set out to define the specific 
pieces of information that count as PII,160 and to apply special privacy 
rules when records contain PII.161 Historically, they have taken the 
approach of trying to delineate, in advance, the discrete bits of information 
that would make it possible to associate a record with the person whose 
information has been captured in the record.162 
But conceiving of PII as a fixed set of sensitive attributes (for example, 
name, date of birth, etc.)—as these laws do—makes little sense when any 
kind of information (for example, movie viewing habits, search queries, 
etc.) might be uniquely identifying.163 What policies often overlook is that 
information is or is not uniquely identifying only when juxtaposed against 
information about others, regardless of how “sensitive” we might imagine 
it to be. This insight has turned the notion of PII on its head. What is 
personally identifiable is not an inherent property of certain pieces of 
information; it is a function of how effectively any information 
distinguishes people from one another. Information becomes personally 
identifiable when it makes someone’s records different from everybody 
else’s. A Social Security number, for example, is not identifying in its own 
right; it is identifying only because no two people have the same number, 
so it does the work of distinguishing people from one another.164 Should 
there be a mistake and two people receive the same number, the number 
would cease to be uniquely identifying. The relevant lesson is that unique 
identifiers are necessarily relational: a piece of information about a 
specific person is only unique—or not unique—when compared to what 
is known about others. 
Various strategies have been developed to deal with this problem.165 
Differential privacy techniques respond to this concern by considering 
identifiability as a quality of a dataset, rather than tying it to specific 
identifiers.166  
 
160. For example, HIPAA sets forth eighteen categories of identifiers that must be removed for a 
dataset to be considered “de-identified” under the rule; these include attributes like names, email 
addresses, account numbers, and fingerprints. 
161. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b) (2019). 
162. Id.  
163. Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Myths and Fallacies of “Personally Identifiable 
Information,” 53 COMM. ACM 24 (2010). 
164. But see SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN AMERICA 
64–65 (2018) (discussing the early days of Social Security numbers when they were not unique). 
165. AARON ROTH & MICHAEL KEARNS, THE ETHICAL ALGORITHM (2019) (describing strategies 
including suppressing certain fields, coarsening the values in each field (for example, move from birth 
day to birth year), injecting noise into the records (swapping, controlled randomization, etc.), or only 
reporting aggregate statistics). 
166. See generally Cynthia Dwork, A Firm Foundation for Private Data Analysis, 54 COMM. ACM 
86 (2011) (describing the technical foundations of differential privacy). 
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2. Anomaly Detection 
In a related case, many individuals’ information is viewable to an 
Observer, who aggregates the data into a central database. Individuals 
may be required to render this information by law, or pressured to do so 
by norm; whatever the cause, the result must be that the Observer has 
access to data from many parties—including both Alice and Bob. In this 
case, the Observer seeks to learn whose data are anomalous in the set, in 
order to detect fraud, wrongdoing, or irregularity meriting investigation 
or sanction. 
Assume, here, that the Observer finds that Bob’s behavior is 
anomalous. The Observer can only render this judgment by establishing 
what normal behavior looks like and assessing abnormal behavior with 
reference to that norm—a norm established by the aggregated data of 
multiple Alices. The group of conforming Alices, and the provision of 
their own data, are essential to constructing the comparison group that 
defines Bob’s data as anomalous. This insight—that identifying deviation 
from the norm depends, fundamentally, on first identifying the norm—
has both statistical and sociological roots. Statistical outliers are defined 
by their distance from most other observations; the sociology of deviance 
takes as one of its tenets the fact that “social groups create deviance by 
making the rules [or norms] whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by 
applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as 
outsiders.”167 
Crucially, in this case, the Observer already has Bob’s data—but 
cannot make Bob’s data meaningful until they are placed in comparison 
to others’ data. The data at issue may be a single outlying data point or an 
unusual pattern of behavior, assessed by creating a model from Alice’s 
data patterns. For instance, subpoenas are routinely issued for electricity 
usage reports from utility companies; unusually high usage as compared 
to usage by neighbors or by similarly-sized properties can provide 
incriminating evidence of indoor marijuana grow operations.168 Bernie 
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme was “made,” in part, because the returns on his 
investments were consistently high in all sorts of conditions, in contrast 
to the volatility that other investors experienced.169 Credit card fraud 
 
167.  HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 9 (1963). 
168. See, e.g., United States v. Gifford, 727 F.3d 92, 101 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing whether 
comparator houses for determining abnormal utility usage were sufficiently similar in size); United 
States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1112–13 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding no privacy expectation in utility 
bills used for such purposes). 
169. Con of the Century, ECONOMIST (Dec. 8, 2008), https://www.economist.com/node/12818310 
[https://perma.cc/292G-9ER2]. Other quantitative indicators of hedge fund fraud include extremely 
low correlation of returns with those of index funds, and serial correlation in returns over time (i.e., 
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detection also depends on spotting deviation from normal spending 
behaviors, and increasingly uses machine learning methods to do so.170 
There is one special case of anomaly detection worth noting. In most 
scenarios, Bob’s data are anomalous because they are distinguishable 
from the norm established by multiple Alices. Sometimes, however, 
Bob’s data are anomalous because of their indistinguishability. Plagiarism 
detection is the clearest example: Turnitin’s detection software compares 
submitted assignments against a database of other submissions and 
published works, and issues “similarity reports” to alert instructors if a 
submission too closely resembles another in the set.171 This case might 
appear to be the converse of the other instances described, as it is Bob’s 
lack of uniqueness compared to Alices’ data that is the “tell”—but we can 
understand it in similar terms. Here, the norm to which most Alices accord 
is uniqueness, and Bob’s deviation from this norm leads to his detection. 
No single Alice’s contribution to the dataset will “make” Bob in these 
cases; rather, many Alices’ data are required to make Bob’s deviation 
from the norm apparent. Initially, then, this may seem to be a fairly weak 
form of dependency, as the responsibility for outing Bob is diffuse across 
many Alices. But this diffusion has two important consequences for 
privacy. First, it justifies dragnet surveillance by the Observer. Since 
anomalies can only be detected with reference to norms, all Alices’ data 
are required (or so the argument goes) to make meaning of Bob’s; an 
enormous amount of data is collected based on the premise that it is 
necessary for fraud detection. Former NSA head Keith Alexander 
famously defended the agency’s bulk surveillance program on similar 
grounds, claiming that “you need the haystack to find the needle.”172 
Second, social considerations are unlikely to limit Alice’s disclosure: 
Alice’s rendering of her own data likely engenders in her no sense of 
responsibility for how it contributes to fingering Bob. (Who among us 
feels that we have helped to call attention to a pot grower through our 
electricity usage?) This limits the degree to which we can reasonably 
 
abnormally “smooth” returns). In both cases, these results stand out because of their contrast with 
“normal” behavior. Nicolas P. B. Bollen & Veronika K. Pool, Suspicious Patterns in Hedge Fund 
Returns and the Risk of Fraud, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 2673, 2677–81 (2012). 
170. See, e.g., Siddhartha Bhattacharyya et al., Data Mining for Credit Card Fraud: A Comparative 
Study, 50 DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS. 602 (2011). For a thorough overview of algorithmic methods 
for anomaly detection across domain areas, see Varun Chandola et al., Anomaly Detection: A Survey, 
41 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 1 (Sept. 2009). 
171. Similarity Reports: Interpreting a Similarity Report, TURNITIN, http://turnitin.com/self-
service/support-wizard.html#inst-similarity-two [https://perma.cc/8QMJ-WTDD]. 
172. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of Email Address Books Globally, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-
millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-
7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html [https://perma.cc/4KYG-MHZF]. For discussion of the haystack metaphor 
more generally and other instances of its use in surveillance contexts, see Sarah Logan, The Needle 
and the Damage Done: Of Haystacks and Anxious Panopticons, 4 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1 (2017). 
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expect Alices to mobilize toward protecting Bob’s privacy; if anything, 
rules and norms counsel Alice to disclose. 
3. Adverse Inference 
In anomaly detection, Bob’s deviation from Alices’ norm concerns 
some characteristic of the data tendered by each—an outlying value, say, 
or an atypical pattern—which arouses the Observer’s scrutiny of Bob. But 
Bob may also deviate by failing to disclose information at all, in 
contravention of Alices’ norm to disclose. If normal Alices tend to readily 
disclose some piece of information to the Observer, and Bob takes some 
privacy-protective measures to avoid doing so, Bob’s very act of 
impeding the Observer’s view may provoke suspicion by being 
definitionally abnormal. Alices’ decision to routinely disclose (or not to 
routinely withhold) data about themselves can result in Bob’s 
nondisclosure leading to an adverse inference against him, thus 
implicating his privacy. 
We often make inferences from atypical absences of information. If 
most job applicants detail their employment histories on LinkedIn, not 
having a profile is a red flag to potential employers;173 if your dating 
profile lacks a photograph when most have one, prospective partners are 
likely to infer that you must be unattractive.174 Nondisclosure is 
understood by an Observer as a negative signal against the backdrop of 
other people disclosing. Effectively, the source of the inference is a 
version of the “nothing-to-hide” fallacy detailed by Daniel Solove: that 
Bob’s unusual, privacy-protective concealment of information signals 
that he must have some incriminating or undesirable attribute he wishes 
to keep secret.175 This is akin to what Julian Sanchez has called the 
redactor’s dilemma: the idea that taking uncommon pains to keep certain 
bits of information hidden is itself an ironically communicative act.176 For 
 
173. Allison Cheston, Recruiters Say: Avoid LinkedIn At Your Peril, FORBES (May 11, 2012), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/work-in-progress/2012/05/11/recruiters-say-avoid-linkedin-at-your-
peril/#642d363021f6 [https://perma.cc/9V55-XEUZ] (quoting a staffing agency director saying that 
“[i]f we are staffing for a recruiting or sales/marketing/business development role, then it is a big red 
flag if a candidate has either no profile or a limited profile with a low number of connections”). 
174. Cf. Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-
Disclosure Future, 105 NW. L. REV. 1153, 1192 (2011) (making a similar observation in the context 
of selling a car on eBay).  
175. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY 22 (2011) [hereinafter SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE]. 
176. Julian Sanchez, The Redactor’s Dilemma, JULIAN SANCHEZ BLOG (Dec. 8, 2009), 
http://www.juliansanchez.com/2009/12/08/the-redactors-dilemma/ [https://perma.cc/6YLC-Z4XM]. 
Related phenomena include the negative signals communicated by Glomar responses and Fifth 
Amendment invocations; though neither legally implicates the speaker for wrongdoing, the public 
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example, satellite images may blur sensitive military compounds to 
obscure them from view—which, should nothing else be blurred, 
effectively calls attention to the location of said compounds.177 In many 
cases, the mere use of an encryption or anonymization tool can create 
suspicion of suspect behavior.178 
Crucially, the fact that Bob’s behavior is unusual as compared to the 
rest of the set—the Alices, who do not take similar privacy-protective 
measures—makes it communicative. Were it to be common for the Alices 
to protect their own privacy, it would alleviate the negative signal created 
by Bob’s behavior. Whether or not Bob’s behavior is construed as 
“hiding” depends on the “normal” behaviors of others in a given social 
context.179 Wearing clothing at work isn’t construed as a concealment, but 
wearing clothing on the beach might be. Closing the door to the bathroom 
or having curtains on a house180 are common privacy-protective measures 
that arouse no adverse inference because they are the norm; we interpret 
these everyday concealments as polite measures that preserve dignity 
and  decorum.181 
 
often perceives them as “saying something by not saying something.” Thanks to James Grimmelmann 
for calling this example to our attention. 
177. Matt Korda, Widespread Blurring of Satellite Images Reveals Secret Facilities, FED’N AM. 
SCIENTISTS (Dec. 10, 2018), https://fas.org/blogs/security/2018/12/widespread-blurring-of-satellite-
images-reveals-secret-facilities/ [https://perma.cc/HVU5-K2XW]. Thanks to Arvind Narayanan for 
calling this example to our attention. 
178. For example, former CIA chief Mike Pompeo wrote in a Wall Street Journal op-ed in 2016 
that “the use of strong encryption in personal communications may itself be a red flag” for terrorism. 
Mike Pompeo & David B. Rivkin, Jr., Time for a Rigorous National Debate About Surveillance, 
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 3, 2016, 4:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/time-for-a-rigorous-national-
debate-about-surveillance-1451856106 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
179. Conversely, what behaviors we interpret as privacy-invasive are contingent on social norms. 
The sociologist Erving Goffman coined the term “civil inattention” to refer to the collection of polite 
behaviors—say, refraining from making sustained eye contact—that people tend to extend to one 
another in public to maintain feelings of privacy in crowded spaces. ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS 
IN PUBLIC 385 (1972).  
180.  SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE, supra note 177, at 23. 
181. Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477, 537 (2006) (“Today’s 
norms and practices . . . call for the concealment of many aspects of the body, bodily functions, and 
strong displays of emotion. We protect against the exposure of these bodily aspects because this 
protection safeguards human dignity as defined by modern society . . . . The need for privacy, and 
therefore the prevention of exposure, is created by the fact that we have social relationships and 
concomitant norms of dignity and decorum.”). 
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But unusual privacy-protective measures—like selective encryption of 
files182 or avoiding contact with police183—may arouse suspicion 
precisely because they violate perceived norms. As Elizabeth Joh has 
noted, taking steps to evade surveillance (buying a burner phone, using 
cash, blocking one’s face from cameras, and the like) can raise suspicion, 
even when such actions are motivated by political or personal privacy 
preferences, rather than wrongdoing. And they do so because of police’s 
assumptions about which behaviors are commonplace and which are 
not.184 As a result, innocent people are incentivized to alter their behavior 
to avoid being seen as suspicious—since such labeling comes with social 
costs, even without substantiated wrongdoing.185 This “tax” on innocent 
 
182. For example, in United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013), border agents in 
Arizona inspected two laptops belonging to Cotterman, a registered sex offender, and found that 
certain files on the laptops were password-protected; upon further examination, the agents found child 
pornography, leading to Cotterman’s arrest. In determining whether the border agents had reasonable 
suspicion to justify the search of Cotterman’s computers, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the 
existence of specific password-protected files was a factor supporting the reasonableness of the 
search. Id. at 969. In so doing, the court grappled explicitly with how normal such a privacy-protective 
measure is, noting that “[w]e are reluctant to place much weight on [the password-protection of the 
files] because it is commonplace for business travelers, casual computer users, students and others to 
password protect their files. Law enforcement ‘cannot rely solely on factors that would apply to many 
law-abiding citizens,’ . . . and password-protection is ubiquitous.” Id. (emphasis added, internal 
citation omitted). Moreover, password-protection of an entire device, rather than files within a device, 
would not support a search, because device-level password-protection is an extremely common means 
of ensuring security. Id. n.17. The court ultimately held that selective password-protection of files 
could help support a border search when combined with other factors creating reasonable suspicion. 
183. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). In Wardlow, police were deemed to have had 
reasonable suspicion to stop an individual based on his “unprovoked flight upon noticing” them in a 
high-crime area. Id. at 124. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that “[h]eadlong 
flight . . . is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is 
certainly suggestive of such.” Id. In a partial dissent, Justice Stevens called attention to several 
alternative rationales that would weaken the signal of suspicion conveyed by flight, noting that “[a] 
pedestrian may break into a run for a variety of reasons—to catch up with a friend a block or two 
away, to seek shelter from an impending storm, to arrive at a bus stop before the bus leaves, to get 
home in time for dinner, to resume jogging after a pause for rest, to avoid contact with a bore or a 
bully, or simply to answer the call of nature—any of which might coincide with the arrival of an 
officer in the vicinity.” Id. at 128–29. He added that unprovoked flight from police “is neither 
‘aberrant’ nor ‘abnormal’” for members of minority groups for whom contact with police may itself 
be dangerous. Id. at 133.  
184. Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests: Surveillance Evasion and Fourth Amendment Suspicion, 
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 997, 1016–17 (2013) (“Because suspicious behavior is often unusual behavior, 
police judgments about criminally suspicious behavior are necessarily hunches about abnormality, 
regularity, and conformity.”). 
185. See L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment and the Duties of Law-Abiding 
Persons, 99 GEO. L.J. 1517 (2011). Atkinson points out that the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against only unreasonable searches incentivizes even law abiders to act non-suspiciously. Id. at 1520. 
Because people have no legal recourse against a reasonable but erroneous search, they internalize the 
private costs (hassle, loss of dignity, reputational harm, etc.) of the risks of being searched. Id. at 
1543. Atkinson argues that this aspect of the Fourth Amendment channels law abiders to act in a way 
that minimizes erroneous searches by making it easier for police to identify wrongdoers by their 
suspicious activity. Id. at 1520. In other words, it incentivizes people to act “normally.” 
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privacy-protective activity is imposed more heavily on groups that are 
over-policed or otherwise subject to heightened suspicion.186 When 
privacy-protective behavior intersects with constitutional rights—for 
example, when the behavior consists of refusing a warrantless search of 
one’s person or property—courts have struggled with the degree to which 
such behavior can be interpreted as a signal of wrongdoing.187 
The line between a negative signal and a social norm is a malleable 
one. Should others begin to withhold information in the same manner as 
Bob, the adverse inference created by Bob’s concealment is weakened. 
This argument counsels in favor of understanding privacy as a collective 
good that can be collectively protected. We previously discussed why 
tactics like obfuscation and the use of anonymity networks attenuate the 
conditions required for identifying Bob through process of elimination;188 
at the same time, when these strategies become more common, they 
normalize privacy-protective activity and weaken the signal of 
wrongdoing that may be associated with it. As Bruce Schneier writes: 
Encryption should be enabled for everything by default, not a 
feature you turn on only if you’re doing something you consider 
worth protecting . . . . If we only use encryption when we’re 
working with important data, then encryption signals that data’s 
importance. If only dissidents use encryption in a country, that 
country’s authorities have an easy way of identifying them. But if 
everyone uses it all of the time, encryption ceases to be a signal. 
No one can distinguish simple chatting from deeply private 
conversation. The government can’t tell the dissidents from the 
rest of the population. Every time you use encryption, you’re 
protecting someone who needs to use it to stay alive.189 
 
186. Id. at 1524–25. 
187. Generally, the invocation of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights cannot be considered as 
evidence of guilt, as doing so places “an unfair and impermissible burden” on the exercise of such 
rights, robbing them of their meaning. United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1351 (9th Cir. 1978). 
However, some state statutes do allow a driver’s refusal to submit to blood and breath tests to be 
considered as evidence of wrongdoing on the basis of implied consent laws that attach to operation 
of a vehicle in those states. The tension between these evidentiary consequences and Fourth 
Amendment protection is currently unresolved. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bell v. 
Pennsylvania, __ U.S. __ (No. 19-622), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19-
622/122507/20191114190036011_No.__PetitionForAWritOfCertiorari.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WTA8-J3K2] (seeking certiorari to determine evidentiary consequences of refusal 
to submit to warrantless blood test). See generally Kylie Fisher, Save Your Breath: A Constitutional 
Analysis of the Criminal Penalties for Refusing Breathalyzer Tests in the Wake of Birchfield v. North 
Dakota, 94 WASH. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2019). 
188. See supra section II.C.1. 
189. Bruce Schneier, Why We Encrypt, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (June 23, 2015), 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/06/why_we_encrypt.html [https://perma.cc/VL6Z-
C236]; see also Joh, supra note 169, at 1004 (describing everyday efforts to thwart surveillance as 
being a form of “privacy protest” with social value); Scott Skinner-Thompson, Performative Privacy, 
50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1673 (2016) (characterizing same as expressive acts of resistance). 
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Making Bob’s privacy dependent on the collective action of many 
Alices is a risky proposition, since—as we have described—Alice may be 
disincentivized from taking privacy-protective steps herself. One of the 
most powerful structural ways to normalize these steps is to obviate the 
collective action problem through design defaults.190 Design defaults 
effectively scrub privacy-protective behaviors of meaningful signals by 
making such behaviors both widespread and deniable.191 
The Observer can make adverse inferences from Bob’s nondisclosure 
when “normal” Alices disclose. In addition, a special case of adverse 
inference from nondisclosure, unraveling, emerges when Alice and Bob 
are explicitly ranked against one another, competing for some service or 
position. The logic that underlies unraveling is this:192 disclosure of some 
type of information is officially voluntary, but the Observer attaches value 
to disclosure with some incentive or benefit—say, a discount—if the 
discloser has some desirable attribute. Assume that Alice initially 
discloses some attribute that puts her in a good light, and that Bob has a 
comparatively weaker value for that attribute. Upon Alice’s disclosure, 
Bob can be affected in one of two ways. He might disclose, despite 
preferring not to, in order to distinguish himself from even worse 
performers. Or he might not disclose and, as a result, be subject to adverse 
inference based on his nondisclosure. Though Bob technically has the 
power to choose, his choice is illusory: whether or not he discloses, 
Alice’s provision of information facilitates the Observer learning more 
about Bob regardless of what Bob does, either explicitly, should Bob 
disclose, or through adverse inference, should he withhold. The 
mechanism that drives unraveling is the incentivized desire to distinguish 
oneself from a group—specifically, to designate oneself as above average 
on some dimension. But as more people disclose, the average of the 
remaining non-disclosing pool shifts ever downward, until everyone has 
 
190. Ironically, market dominance and service lock-in have fortunate side effects when their default 
settings are privacy-protective. Dieter Bohn, Why I Turned On iMessage, VERGE (Jun. 13, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/13/18677644/imessage-iphone-apple-secure-encrypted-chat-
moral-imperative-signal-rcs-hangouts [https://perma.cc/4KKT-PFXR] (noting the benefits of 
iMessage being encrypted by default rather than trying to convince people to switch to a third-party 
encrypted chat app). 
191. Karen Levy & Bruce Schneier, Privacy Threats in Intimate Relationships, J. CYBERSECURITY 
(forthcoming 2020) (on file with authors). Since many people never adjust privacy settings, making data 
private by default increases the number of people using them, and also obviates the need for a person to 
take affirmative steps to protect privacy, which can function as a “tell.” 
192. The most thorough treatment of unraveling in the information privacy law context is Peppet, 
supra note 174; see also MacCarthy, supra note 20, at 26–27 (summarizing adverse inferences to be 
drawn from nondisclosure in eligibility decisions). 
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either disclosed or is subject to inference that their value for the attribute 
is of the lowest quality.193 
To illustrate, imagine that a university that used to require standardized 
test scores for admissions decisions opts to make such disclosure 
voluntary.194 Alice, who has a very high score, will surely share this 
information with the university. Bob, who has a somewhat lower but still 
respectable score, will be incentivized to disclose as well, because he 
wants to avoid being lumped in with the masses; he wants the Observer to 
know that he is superior (along this dimension) to students with even 
lower scores. If Bob refrains from sharing his score, the university may 
infer that his nondisclosure masks poor performance: if he did well, why 
not share? Bob’s disclosure has the same effect on someone with a 
marginally lower score than Bob—and on down the line—such that in the 
end, nearly everyone has disclosed, and those who haven’t are assumed to 
be the worst of the lot. 
The configuration shares some resemblance with identification through 
process of elimination,195 in which Alice’s disclosure is also self-
interested. There, disclosure serves to exculpate Alice from culpability, 
increasing Bob’s probability of being identified. Here, Alice’s disclosure 
favorably differentiates her from the crowd—and in so doing, impugns 
Bob if he does not also disclose. Both Alice’s and Bob’s disclosures are 
purportedly individual and voluntary—but they really aren’t, precisely 
because Alice and Bob are in competition with one another for some sort 
of favorable treatment. Disclosure is a way to convince the observer that 
“I am not like these other people; I am better than (at least some of) them,” 
and its effect is to create social cleavage and undermine solidarity.196 
As Scott Peppet describes, unraveling has limits: it only applies when 
disclosure is low-cost and credible, and when no countervailing norms 
militate against it.197 Legal constraints attempt to prevent unraveling in a 
variety of ways. They may prohibit (even voluntary) disclosures, but 
doing so is difficult to justify and often in conflict with First Amendment 
interests—and self-interested actors can often make end-runs around such 
rules though signaling in other ways.198 In the alternative, law might 
 
193. See Peppet, supra note 174, at 1181.  
194. See id. at 1196. In this hypothetical, the university has historical data about applicant scores, owing 
to its recent policy change. In the absence of such data, the university would have to either ascribe some 
central score to everyone in the pool or use readily available data as proxies. Id. at 1161. 
195. See supra section II.C.1. 
196. See Peppet, supra note 174, at 1202 (“The ability to disclose—even at the risk of unraveling 
privacy—brings with it the ability to seek economic advantage. There are distributive stakes here.”). 
197. See id. at 1190–96. 
198. See id. at 1198–99. For a review of other disclosure and nondisclosure rules in law, see Adam 
M. Samaha & Lior J. Strahilevitz, Don’t Ask, Must Tell—And Other Combinations, 103 CALIF. L. 
REV. 919 (2015). 
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prohibit the use of certain forms of data in making some decision, such 
that disclosure ceases to accomplish its intended end. We apply such rules 
in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (which restricts the bases on which 
creditors can deny credit) and in health care statutes that limit what data 
insurers can use in setting premiums.199 But in many contexts, such 
policies are likely to face opposition from those who would benefit from 
disclosure, and as such it may be very difficult to mobilize political 
support for them. 
* * * 
Each of the difference-based dependencies described in this section 
implicates concerns about how we stand out from the crowd. There’s little 
Bob can do to protect his privacy in these cases; in some cases, any 
attempts he might make to do so may, perversely, make him stand out 
even more. The collectivity is essential to privacy preservation here. But 
it can be very difficult to muster collective will among many Alices to 
help Bob achieve privacy, since they are likely either unaware of the 
effects of their disclosures or acting out of requirement or self-interest. 
Because many individuals’ data are required to pinpoint a suspect 
through process of elimination, to identify anomalous data, or to make 
meaning of abnormal nondisclosure, the Observer’s techniques tend 
toward the mass collection of information via dragnets or strong 
expectations of widespread disclosure (enforced through rule, norm, or 
incentive). Given the difficulties of mobilizing collective action, 
difference-based dependencies are best addressed through restrictions on 
this mass collection—for example, prohibiting reverse search warrants, 
barring institutions from using certain types of data in making decisions, 
or leveraging design to impede the signals sent by proactive privacy 
protection. 
III. CASE STUDY: GENETIC DEPENDENCIES 
We turn here to examination of a specific context in which multiple 
forms of dependency are at work. We do this to demonstrate the value of 
clarifying precisely what dependencies are at stake in a given situation, 
and what technical and legal tools are available to protect the interests that 
each implicates. Of late, and due in large part to the proliferation of 
genealogical databases and DNA home-testing kits,200 legal scholars and 
the public are becoming more attuned to the privacy implications of 
 
199. See Peppet, supra note 174, at 1199–200 (discussing these and other examples, and also noting 
the limitations of such policies). 
200. See generally ALONDRA NELSON, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF DNA: RACE, REPARATIONS, AND 
RECONCILIATION AFTER THE GENOME (2016) (discussing the social ramifications of increased access 
to genetic testing, particularly with respect to race). 
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genetic data.201 Genetic information is widely seen as worthy of special 
attention and protection. DNA has a set of qualities that give it particular 
value for a wide range of investigative and predictive uses: it is uniquely 
identifying; it demonstrates immutable relationships with others;202 and it 
predicts propensities for future risks. These qualities also make it readily 
exploitable for all three forms of dependency we identify: tie-based, 
similarity-based, and difference-based. The genetic context presents a 
telling example of how different configurations of privacy dependencies 
can become entwined in practice, and the implications of those 
entanglements for privacy regulation. 
A. Tie-Based 
The 2018 capture of the Golden State Killer203 aroused public attention 
about the forensic power of genetic data. A good deal of the investigation 
of the Golden State Killer relied on tie-based dependencies—genetic 
connections revealed in genealogy databases. The investigation initially 
identified the great-great-great-grandparents of Joseph DeAngelo; from 
there, investigators relied on detective work, constructing family trees 
with thousands of relatives to develop a suspect set.204 As discussed in 
section II.B, other forms of dependency were also exploited in the 
investigation.205  
More and more people are subject to identification based on familial 
ties—without their own direct participation or opportunity to withhold 
consent—as home genetic testing websites grow and as law enforcement 
increasingly gains access to them. Researchers estimate that about 60% of 
European-descended Americans can be genetically linked to at least a 
third cousin through commercial DNA testing services to which law 
enforcement has access, based on the fact that those databases currently 
include samples from about 0.5% of the U.S. adult population.206 If the 
 
201. See Jake Weidman et al., On Sharing Intentions, and Personal and Interdependent Privacy 
Considerations for Genetic Data: A Vignette Study, 16 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON 
COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY & BIOINFORMATICS 1 (2019) (examining what factors affect the 
likelihood of sharing genetic data with different organizations). 
202. Ram, supra note 77, at 877. 
203. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
204. Justin Jouvenal, To Find Golden State Killer, Investigators First Found His Great-Great-
Great Grandparents, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-
safety/to-find-alleged-golden-state-killer-investigators-first-found-his-great-great-great-
grandparents/2018/04/30/3c865fe7-dfcc-4a0e-b6b2-0bec548d501f_story.html (last visited Apr. 17, 
2020). 
205. See infra section II.B. 
206. Yaniv Erlich et al., Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using Long-Range Familial Searches, 
362 SCIENCE 690 (2018); Jocelyn Kaiser, We Will Find You: DNA Search Used to Nab Golden State 
Killer Can Home in on About 60% of White Americans, SCI. MAG. BLOG (Oct. 11, 2018, 2:00 PM), 
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participant figure rises to 2%, expected to occur within two to three years, 
90% of the European-descended population of the United States will be 
identifiable by a third cousin or closer.207 The disclosure decisions of the 
few effectively determine the privacy outcomes for the many. 
Several signs indicate that the exploitation of tie-based genetic 
dependencies is poised to become even more widespread. Police have 
begun using the technique more frequently, and to investigate less serious 
crimes. In March of 2019, police in Utah cooperated with genealogy 
database GEDmatch to identify a suspect in the assault of a church 
organist. Despite GEDmatch’s terms of service specifying that it would 
only cooperate with law enforcement for homicide and sexual assault 
cases, it broke its own rules by pointing police to the seventeen-year-old 
perpetrator’s great-uncle, whose DNA was in its database.208 
Further, some genealogy companies have shown a marked change in 
how they talk about the use of their databases for investigative purposes. 
FamilyTreeDNA, which has a partnership with the FBI, implores 
customers in a new ad campaign to help “provide the missing link”209 
through DNA samples that could help solve violent crimes. 
FamilyTreeDNA’s founder said the company had “a moral responsibility” 
to help solve cold cases and bring families closure.210 The genomics 
company Verogen, upon its purchase of GEDMatch, made a similar 
appeal: “Never before have we as a society had the opportunity to serve 
as a molecular eyewitness, enabling law enforcement to solve violent 
crimes efficiently and with certainty.”211These claims do not, however, 




207. Heather Murphy, Most White Americans’ DNA Can Be Identified Through Genealogy 
Databases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/science/science-
genetic-genealogy-study.html [https://perma.cc/SDT2-YJW2]. 
208. Peter Aldhous, The Arrest of a Teen on an Assault Charge Has Sparked New Privacy Fears 
About DNA Sleuthing, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/genetic-genealogy-parabon-gedmatch-assault 
[https://perma.cc/Q7SQ-R7BU]. 
209.  Jennings Brown, Ancestry-Testing Company: It’s Our ‘Moral Responsibility’ to Give the FBI 
Access to Your DNA, GIZMODO (Apr. 3, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://gizmodo.com/ancestry-testing-
company-it-s-our-moral-responsibilit-1833774781 [https://perma.cc/JN5F-23QL]. 
210. Id. At the same time, some companies have restricted law enforcement access in response to 
privacy concerns. Kristen V. Brown, DNA Site that Helps Cold-Case Sleuths Curbs Access for Cops, 
BLOOMBERG (June 10, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-10/dna-
site-that-helps-cold-case-sleuths-curbs-access-for-police [https://perma.cc/636A-VMYU]. 
211. Julian Husbands, GEDMatch Partners with Genomics Firm, VEROGEN (Dec. 9, 2019), 
https://verogen.com/gedmatch-partners-with-genomics-firm/ [https://perma.cc/K525-P4DU]. 
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FamilyTreeDNA’s words) “crowd-source crime solving”212—by 
providing incriminating information about their own family members. 
B. Similarity-Based 
Genetic information is often the basis for similarity-based dependency, 
most commonly in the context of inferred characteristics based on genetic 
markers. Even without understanding the biological pathways between 
genes and propensities for disease, researchers can make inferences about 
a person’s probability of developing various health conditions based on 
their resemblance to others with similar genetic profiles. Pharmaceutical 
giant GlaxoSmithKline recently purchased a $300 million stake in home 
DNA testing company 23andMe that brings with it exclusive rights to use 
23andMe’s trove of data to develop drug targets.213 In addition to having 
customers’ genetic information, 23andMe sends regular surveys to its 
customers to capture phenotypic and behavioral data,214 and runs a health 
hub “where customers can share information about how they manage 18 
common health conditions”—giving the company and its partners access 
to self-reported information on condition prevalence and efficacy of 
various treatments for people with known genetic profiles.215 Glaxo’s 
hope is to generalize from 23andMe’s data by making inferences about 
the predispositions and treatment responsiveness of potential customers 
who don’t have 23andMe profiles, but share genetic patterns with those 
on the platform. 
Notably, disease risk scoring using genetic data is far more accurate for 
European-descended individuals than for those with African, Latino, or 
Asian ancestries—a consequence of the Eurocentric composition of 
individuals who have participated in scientific genome studies. This 
underrepresentation—which has been called “the major ethical and 
scientific challenge surrounding clinical translation and, at present, the 
most critical limitation to genetics in precision medicine”216—stands in 
 
212. Brown, supra note 210. 
213. Megan Molteni, 23andMe’s Pharma Deals Have Been the Plan All Along, WIRED (Aug. 3, 
2018, 3:28 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/23andme-glaxosmithkline-pharma-deal/ 
[https://perma.cc/NBD8-6SMP]. 
214. Id. 
215. Megan Molteni, 23andMe Wants You to Share Even More Health Data, WIRED (Apr. 20, 
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/23andme-wants-you-to-share-even-more-health-data/ 
[https://perma.cc/8XUG-RQP9]. 
216. Alicia R. Martin et al., Clinical Use of Current Polygenic Risk Scores May Exacerbate Health 
Disparities, 51 NATURE GENETICS 584, 584 (2019). 
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stark contrast to the overrepresentation of those groups in DNA databases 
used for criminal investigation.217  
Insurers may also be interested in making inferences about a person’s 
future health based on genetic profiles.218 The Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) bans health insurers from using genetic 
information about an individual or that individual’s family members to 
make coverage determinations or set premiums—but long-term care 
insurers, disability insurers, and life insurers are not restricted from doing 
so.219 The life insurer YouSurance, for example, uses epigenetic data—
information about gene expression modified by influences from the 
environment and behaviors—to set differential rates for its policies.220 As 
scientific understanding of genes and their expression continues to 
progress—and as more people participate in scientific studies and 
exchange information on their health conditions on 23andMe—the basis 
for genetic inference and the predictive power of these data will only 
grow. 
Similarity-based dependencies that rely on phenotype are also 
implicated in some criminal investigations. Forensic DNA phenotyping is 
used to predict the physical traits of an unknown person who has left a 
DNA sample at a crime scene, based on probabilistic associations with 
traits in other people with similar DNA profiles. The technique can be 
used to predict traits like hair color, skin color, eye color, freckling, height, 
baldness, and earlobe attachment.221 In several cold cases, law 
enforcement agencies have released DNA phenotype composite images 
in hopes of identifying a suspect.222 Sometimes, dependencies are utilized 
in tandem: in the Golden State Killer case, after several men were 
identified as persons of interest based on familial matching and 
circumstantial evidence (like residency in California during the time of 
the murders), genetic genealogists used health risk and eye color analysis 
websites to determine that people with the genetic profile of the unknown 
 
217. Erin Murphy & Jun Tong, The Racial Composition of Forensic DNA Databases, 108 CALIF. 
L. REV. (2020) (forthcoming). 
218. See supra notes 136–138 and accompanying text. 
219. Michelle Andrews, Genetic Tests Can Hurt Your Chances of Getting Some Types of 
Insurance, NPR (Aug. 7, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2018/08/07/636026264/genetic-tests-can-hurt-your-chances-of-getting-some-types-of-
insurance [https://perma.cc/QFH8-MERL].  
220. YOUSURANCE, https://www.yousurance.com/science/ [https://perma.cc/4F9U-W6GP]. 
221. See Charles E. MacLean & Adam Lamparello, Forensic DNA Phenotyping in Criminal 
Investigations and Criminal Courts: Assessing and Mitigating the Dilemmas Inherent in the Science, 
8 RECENT ADVANCES IN DNA & GENE SEQUENCES 104, 104 (2014). 
222. See, e.g., Sean Alloca, First DNA-Phenotyped Image of ‘Person of Interest’ in Double 
Homicide, FORENSIC MAG., Jan. 15, 2015 (describing release of phenotype composite image in search 
for suspect in South Carolina homicide). 
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sample were likely to have blue eyes and to bald prematurely. Only one 
of the identified suspects from that set—Joseph DeAngelo—had those 
characteristics.223 
C. Difference-Based 
Genetic data can also be the basis of the third type of privacy 
dependency, based on difference between people. As discussed, genetic 
data is commonly used as a way to identify an unknown person—for 
instance, by matching a DNA sample from a crime scene with information 
from genetic profiles of known individuals (e.g., against a database of 
samples held by law enforcement or a genetic testing company). In other 
cases, though, investigators might try to collect DNA samples from all 
members of a circumscribed set of suspects, on the belief that testing an 
unidentified sample from a crime scene against these newly collected 
samples will either identify the culprit or rule out the innocent. These 
cases meet the conditions in which process of elimination dependencies 
can arise:224 there is an (assumed) finite set of individuals who may have 
committed the offense, the individuals are genetically distinguishable as 
to one another, and the suspect set is not so large as to make bulk 
collection pragmatically impossible. When these conditions are met, 
genetic data can be used to identify Bob—who may not tender a sample—
because innocent Alices submit their own, winnowing down the suspect 
set. Unlike the tie-based genetic dependencies in familial searches of 
existing genetic databases, collecting new DNA samples creates a 
difference-based genetic dependency. 
Dragnet DNA sweeps involve the mass collection of genetic samples 
for purposes of identifying a suspect. The technique is often used in cases 
in which the suspected perpetrator of some wrong is assumed to be one of 
a manageably sized finite set.225 The collection may be premised on rule 
or on norm. In the former case, a search warrant or organizational rule 
may mandate the mass collection of samples. For example, in 2018, a 
woman in an Arizona long-term care facility who had been severely 
incapacitated for a decade gave birth to a baby, leading to a strong 
presumption that she had been sexually assaulted by a caretaker during 
that period. Police served a search warrant on the facility seeking DNA 
 
223. Heather Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case. Here’s What She’s Going 
to Do Next., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/science/barbara-rae-
venter-gsk.html [https://perma.cc/E62D-3MGS]. 
224. See supra section II.C.1. 
225. David M. Halbfinger, Police Dragnets For DNA Tests Draw Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 
2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/04/us/police-dragnets-for-dna-tests-draw-criticism.html 
[https://perma.cc/79YS-D9NS] (describing several DNA dragnets used by law enforcement, and 
noting that such mass screenings have been more successful “when the police have narrowed their 
focus to smaller groups”). 
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samples from all its male employees226—under the assumption that one 
of them was very likely to have raped the woman—in order to determine 
whose DNA matched that of the baby.227 
In other cases, individuals may be coerced into giving samples based 
on a desire to self-exculpate, a belief that they have no right to refuse, or 
based on some more generalized sense of civic duty—knowing that by 
tendering their own DNA, they are not only reducing the size of the 
candidate pool, but are also helping to create a norm toward disclosure, 
the violation of which will create adverse inference against the non-
compliant.228 In a 2003 case, for example, police asked 800 Louisiana men 
for DNA to be matched against unidentified murder scene samples; one 
man (who was not implicated in the killings) was told by police that 
submitting to a cheek swab “was his choice . . . but if he refused, [the 
police] would get a court order that would get in the newspapers and then 
everyone would know he was not cooperating.”229 In a similar 
Massachusetts sweep in 2005 in which all adult males in a town were 
asked to submit DNA, one man who volunteered his sample said he did 
so because “[i]f it gives them one less suspect, that’s fine by me . . . . I 
don’t have anything to hide.”230 Similar norms were invoked in response 
to a 2004 Oklahoma dragnet: police announced that failure to cooperate 
by voluntarily submitting a sample “leaves an open end out there for us to 
look at.”231 
In practice, these investigations often implicate multiple privacy 
dependencies. An investigation of the 1998 murder of an eleven-year-old 
boy in the Netherlands, for example, relied on a combination of familial 
matching and adverse inference by nondisclosure: in seeking to identify 
DNA found on the victim’s clothing, prosecutors sought voluntary 
collection from over 20,000 Dutchmen based on familial matching, as 
 
226. DNA Samples Sought at Facility Where Woman in Vegetative State Gave Birth, CBS NEWS 
(Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dna-samples-sought-at-facility-where-woman-in-
vegetative-state-gave-birth/ [https://perma.cc/Z3U3-NZKU]. 
227. This case is unusual in that investigators’ search is premised not on a DNA sample from the 
culprit himself, only the baby with whom he must have a partial genetic match. In this sense, the 
investigative strategy is also taking advantage of tie-based genetic dependencies. 
228. For discussion of potential Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges to “voluntary” DNA 
dragnets, see Lauren Kirchner, DNA Dragnet: In Some Cities, Police Go From Stop-and-Frisk to 
Stop-and-Spit, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/dna-dragnet-in-
some-cities-police-go-from-stop-and-frisk-to-stop-and-spit [https://perma.cc/J6XT-LWWG]. 
229. Halbfinger, supra note 225. 
230. Jonathan Finer, Baffled Police Try DNA Sweep, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2097-2005Jan11.html [https://perma.cc/KVB5-
9XND]. 
231. Rebecca Leung, DNA Dragnet, CBS NEWS (Sept. 10, 2004), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dna-dragnet/ [https://perma.cc/7FVG-MLPL]. 
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well as mandatory collection from 1,500 men “of special interest” in the 
case.232 In the end, a match was located based on a combination of 
strategies: when one man failed to submit an obligatory sample and could 
not be located by police, police took DNA samples from his family 
members, which matched the crime scene DNA.233 And even when only 
one dependency is exploited for a particular case, samples may be 
retained for use in other cases in which other dependencies are at play. 
For instance, after police knocked on the doors of over 500 residents of 
East New York, asking them to submit “voluntary” cheek swabs to 
eliminate them from the suspect pool for a nearby murder, the DNA of 
even those exculpated in the current investigation was retained for future 
investigations, including familial matching.234 
D. The Law of Genetic Dependencies 
Consider, then, the variety of ways privacy dependencies attach to the 
use of genetic data. All three types of dependency have been harnessed in 
criminal investigations—and often in combination with one another, 
exploiting the capabilities of each. As we shall see, all three types are 
surprisingly implicated by employment nondiscrimination law as well. 
In 2015, supervisors in an Atlanta grocery warehouse were frustrated 
by repeatedly finding piles of human feces on the floor of their facility. 
The supervisors made a list of potential suspects in an attempt to pinpoint 
the “devious defecator,”235 based on which of their employees’ work 
schedules seemed to align with the timing and location of the offenses; 
they then asked two employees from that list, whom they suspected of 
having left the piles, to give DNA samples to be matched against the 
feces.236 The workers gave the samples, saying they feared for their jobs 
should they refuse. As it turned out, neither was a match. They 
subsequently sued their employer under the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).237 
 
232. Milan Schreuer, 17,500 Dutchmen Gave Their DNA in a Murder Inquiry. After 20 Years, an 
Arrest., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/world/europe/ 
netherlands-murder-dna.html [https://perma.cc/4MJN-TUXP]. 
233. Id. 
234. Allison Lewis, The NYPD’s New DNA Dragnet: The Department is Collecting and Storing 
Genetic Information, With Virtually No Rules to Curb Their Use, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 8, 2019, 
6:52 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-the-nypds-new-dna-dragnet-20190206-
story.htm [https://perma.cc/5SQY-SCNF]. 
235. The case, Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Group Retail Services, 102 F. Supp. 3d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 
2015), soon became colloquially known by this name in the popular press. 
236. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Lowe, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 1360. 
237. Lowe, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 1361. 
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GINA is meant to address the risks of health insurers and employers 
discriminating against people on the basis of genetic tests238 and family 
medical history.239 Privacy is conceptualized in the law not as an end in 
itself,240 but as a “bulwark [to prevent] access to the very information 
health insurers or employers could use to discriminate.”241 The core 
concern to which the law is addressed is the worry that health insurers 
might raise premiums or drop coverage based on health risks revealed by 
genetic data; the law’s application to employers is premised on the 
connection between employment and health insurance cost.242 GINA 
addresses these risks by preventing health insurers from making eligibility 
or premium determinations on the basis of genetic information;243 by 
making it unlawful for employers to discriminate on the basis of genetic 
information; and by making it unlawful for an employer to request or 
require information from an employee or an employee’s family member. 
In other words, GINA was initially devised as an intervention on two 
types of dependency. It addresses similarity-based dependencies because 
genetic information may allow for inference based on the predispositions 
and health outcomes of known individuals with comparable profiles. And 
it speaks to tie-based dependencies because information about the genetic 
profiles and manifested health conditions of family members may be used 
to learn more about the employee—for example, the risk of hereditary 
diseases. In both cases, the goal of the statute is to guard against 
discrimination on the basis of genetic conditions or predispositions. 
Yet in the devious defecator case, the plaintiffs made a different 
argument about GINA’s protections. In their case, the dependency at stake 
was not based on similarity or tie but was a difference-based dependency. 
By drawing up a list of suspected defecators based on work schedules—
and then winnowing the list by asking employees to provide DNA 
samples to exclude themselves from suspicion—the company sought to 
use employees’ DNA for identification, rather than for discrimination 
 
238. By its terms, GINA offers protection for a person’s own genetic tests and the genetic tests of 
her family members. 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2018). 
239. In addition to a family member’s genetic tests, GINA offers protection against discrimination 
on the basis of the manifested health conditions of a person’s family members, including dependents 
and relatives up to four degrees away. Id. GINA does not provide a cause of action for disparate 
impact discrimination based on genetic information, in contrast of other civil rights statutes. See 
Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 75 (2016) (arguing for 
the authorization of a disparate impact cause of action). 
240. Bradeley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of Employee 
Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 711, 715 (2019).  
241. Id. at 718. 
242. Id. at 723–24. 
243. Note that this component of GINA is an example of a “don’t use” restriction, as discussed in 
Peppet, supra note 174, at 1200 et seq. 
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based on the medical information it contained. The crux of the case came 
down to the court’s analysis of whether GINA should be interpreted to 
protect workers against this sort of use. The warehouse company argued 
that the statute should be interpreted only to bar employers from using 
information related to an individual’s propensity for disease.244 Yet the 
plain meaning of the statute, as the employees argued, prohibits employers 
from “request[ing], requir[ing], or purchas[ing] genetic information with 
respect to any individual prior to such individual’s enrollment under the 
plan or coverage in connection with such enrollment,”245 save for certain 
inapplicable exceptions. The jury agreed with this broader interpretation 
and awarded the employees $2.2 million in damages.246 
Our taxonomy of the relevant privacy dependencies explains why many 
were surprised by the case’s outcome. Despite the court’s statutory 
construction legitimating the plaintiffs’ claims, it seems quite clear that 
GINA was conceptualized as a route to protect against similarity- and tie-
based dependency. In response to the ruling, biotechnology law expert 
John Conley opined that “[t]his is an application of the law that no one 
thought of in a million years . . . . But the ruling is not controversial. You 
can’t use genetic testing for dismissal purposes.”247 
The court’s application of GINA to a difference-based dependency 
does more than nominally augment the statute’s purview; it suggests that 
the law might protect a wholly different and more expansive set of 
normative values than those initially conceived. Though the law on its 
face (and by its title) is addressed to concerns about discriminatory 
treatment in rate-setting and to prediction based on genetic data248—both 
forward-looking uses involving actuarial assessment about what an 
employee will do (and cost) in the future—the devious defecator case has 
nothing to do with discrimination or prediction. Instead, it suggests that 
employers may not use employees’ DNA for forensic investigation about 
past events, or for the purposes of identifying and disciplining employees 
for such ostensible misbehavior. This use transforms GINA from a 
 
244. Lowe, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 1365. 
245. 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2018). 
246. Areheart & Roberts, supra note 240, at 752. 
247. Ajunwa, supra note 239, at 113 (quoting Natasha Gilbert, Why the ‘Devious Defecator’ Case 
is a Landmark for US Genetic-Privacy Law, NATURE (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.nature.com/news/why-the-devious-defecator-case-is-a-landmark-for-us-genetic-privacy-
law-1.17857 [https://perma.cc/42MZ-2DP2]). 
248. It is worth noting that GINA’s success as a nondiscrimination statute is equivocal. Areheart 
and Roberts’s empirical survey of cases brought under GINA demonstrated that no successful GINA 
claims have been premised on discrimination based on the results of genetic tests. Areheart & Roberts, 
supra note 240, at 714. 
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relatively narrow risk allocation statute to a “robust protection for 
employee privacy.”249 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Unpacking the disparate mechanisms that create different privacy 
dependencies can give us the necessary clarity for policymaking and 
regulation. Most immediately, it can help us determine if and when we 
even recognize Bob as a party with a legitimate privacy claim when Alice 
is the disclosing or observed party. It can shed light on the varied 
normative goals that we expect privacy to serve under different 
configurations. Finally, attending to the specific relationships that create 
privacy dependencies can suggest possible targets for intervention—
opportunities to capitalize on mutual dependency or ensure greater 
independence. 
Certain forms of dependency afford greater opportunity for social 
solidarities to develop than others do. If people are made aware of how 
their disclosures may implicate close social ties, they may refrain from 
making such disclosures. Inference on the basis of socially salient 
characteristics, particularly those protected by discrimination law, might 
be countered by activism and advocacy. People wishing to preserve 
anonymity within a group might rely on collective action to make 
themselves less readily distinguishable. But other dependencies make 
privacy-protective solidarity less likely, like inference on the basis of non-
socially-salient characteristics and disclosures that involve distinguishing 
oneself from a group for favorable treatment. 
Privacy dependencies should thus not only call into question notice and 
choice as a model for privacy regulation; they should force us to abandon 
the naïve hope that solidarity can help rescue informed consent by 
clarifying the degree to which our privacy choices implicate others. If we 
are scarcely able to make decisions that attend to our own privacy 
interests, the goal of recognizing shared interests should not be to further 
burden our individual choices with an expectation that we take into 
account the interests of others.250 At its best, solidarity can foster 
collective action demanding technologies, policies, and laws that address 
the mechanisms that create dependencies, relieving individuals of the 
 
249. Areheart & Roberts, supra note 240, at 752. Areheart and Roberts go on to note that the 
devious defecator case clarifies the “independent moral value” of workplace privacy as an intrinsic 
harm, analytically separable from the extrinsic harm of potential discrimination based on private 
information. Id. at 779–80. 
250. Contra Carissa Véliz, Privacy is a Collective Concern, NEW STATESMAN (Oct. 22, 2019), 
https://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/privacy/2019/10/privacy-collective-concern 
[https://perma.cc/PGS2-FZJS] (arguing that dependencies make people morally responsible for one 
another’s privacy). 
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impossible task of managing collective interests through their individual 
decisions. Recognizing the mechanisms that create different forms of 
dependency does more than demonstrate the shortcomings of privacy 
individualism; it lays the groundwork for well-tailored policymaking and 
advocacy. 
